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JUDICIAL SUPREMACY RE-EXAMINED: 
A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE 
G. Sidney Buchanan* 
J. INTRODUCTION 
A citizen critic recently expressed to me his bitter opposition to the Warren Court's decisions on school prayer and school de-
segregation.1 If this critic were elected governor of a state or placed 
in some other position of governmental authority, he would almost 
certainly use his power to block public school desegregation and to 
encourage prayer reading in the public schools. Conceding that our 
critic would be acting controversially in so using his power, would 
he be acting unconstitutionally? This is the question which this 
Article ·will attempt to answer. More generally, this Article will 
consider the extent to which a Supreme Court constitutional con-
struction legally binds the rest of the nation. 
This question becomes particularly pertinent with the advent of 
the Burger Court and a potential change in the Court's judicial 
philosophy.2 When we like what the Court is doing, we are more 
prone to hail the Court's decisions as "the supreme law of the land" 
and to urge instant compliance with them. Generally, such urgings 
are wrapped in the verbal cellophane of morality: unless the rest 
of the nation immediately shapes its conduct in accordance with the 
Court's construction of the Constitution, we will become a nation 
of immoral lawbreakers. A casual glance at history reveals the rela-
tivity of this argument. From Lincoln's attack on the Dred Scott 
decision3 to Roosevelt's battle with the Court in the early years of the 
• Professor of Law, University of Houston. A.B. 1956, Princeton University; J.D. 
1959, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
For invaluable critical aid in relation to all major aspects of this article, I express 
appreciation to Professors John Mixon and A. A. White of the University of Houston 
Law School. 
I. Most notably, in the school prayer area, School Dist. of Abington Township v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), and, in the 
school desegregation area, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and its progeny. 
2. Thus far President Nixon has made four appointments to the Supreme Court. 
Recent decisions suggest that the Court will take a more conservative approach in 
many areas of constitutional law than did the Warren Court. In the area of criminal 
procedure, see, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 40 U.S.L.W. 4550 (U.S. May 22, 1972) 
(a witness who invokes his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination can be 
compelled to testify if he is granted immunity from prosecutorial use of his testimony 
and evidence derived therefrom); Apodaca v. Oregon, 40 U.S.L.W. 4528 (U.S. May 22, 
1972) (states can convict a defendant of a noncapital crime by a less than unanimous 
jury verdict); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (a statement inadmissible as part 
of the prosecution's case in chief because of a violation of the Miranda reqnirements 
can nevertheless be used to impeach the defendant's credibility on cross-examination). 
3. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). See note 77 infra. 
[ 1279] 
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New Deal,4 assaults upon the Court came primarily from those linked 
by political philosophy to the Warren Court's most vigorous sup-
porters. Thus, a shift in the pattern of Court decisions will often 
modify a person's commitment to the doctrine of judicial supremacy. 
This truism warns against an absolutist approach in defining the 
Court's role in the federal system. 
Sooner of later, the course of judicial events will compel the 
Court to decide whether the fourteenth amendment's equal protec-
tion clause requires a public school district to overcome racial im-
balance resulting from segregated residential patterns, a condition 
normally called "de facto" segregation.0 Should the Court hold that 
the Constitution requires school districts to eliminate de facto seg-
regation in the public schools, integrationists would rejoice in the 
wisdom of the Court's decision, and segregationist hostility to the 
Court would intensify. A contrary holding would, of course, initiate 
a reversal of these attitudes. More to the point of this Article, either 
holding by the Court would have a pervasive impact on the nation. 
Such a case would illustrate graphically the current relevance of 
asking: Now that the Court has spoken, what next? 
In answering the question of "what next," this Article will first 
describe two competing models for determining the legal effect of a 
Supreme Court decision upon the rest of the nation. These models 
will then be applied to each of the remaining parts of the federal 
system: the lower federal courts, the state courts, the executive and 
legislative branches of the federal government, the executive and 
legislative branches of the state governments, and, finally, the private 
citizen holding no public office. In each application, this Article will 
consider which of the two competing models is most consonant with 
the political system established by the Constitution. Thus, analysis 
of the competing models will be in terms of what the Constitution 
requires within the system it has created and not in terms of what a 
different constitution ought to have required. Even with the scope 
of inquiry thus limited, it is hard to avoid a certain Olympian con-
cern with "oughtness." Unavoidably, a person's belief concerning 
4. In a radio address delivered on March 9, 1937, at the height of his battle with 
the Senate over the Court-packing plan, President Roosevelt stated: 
We have, therefore, reached the point as a Nation where we must take action 
to save the Constitution from the Court and the Court from itself. "\Ve must find 
a way to take an appeal from the Supreme Court to the Constitution itself. We 
want a Supreme Court which will do justice under the Constitution-not over 
it. In our courts we want a government of laws and not of men. 
81 CONG. REc. App. pt. 9, 470 (1937). 
5. Recently the Court expressly avoided this issue in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Bd. of Educ., 403 U.S. I (1971), a case dealing with the desegregation of "dual" school 
districts. 
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what the Constitution ought to require will influence his description 
of what the Constitution does in fact require. This is particularly 
true when we are probing the binding force of a Supreme Court 
decision, a question affecting so fundamentally the operation of the 
federal system. In this area, a quest for descriptive accuracy slips 
ineluctably into an exposition of oughtness. For in. probing the bind-
ing force of a Supreme Court decision, we reach the seminal question 
of jurisprudence: What makes a legal system obligatory in the first 
place?6 
A final introductory problem remains. What does it mean to say 
that a person is "acting unconstitutionally" in relation to a Supreme 
Court constitutional construction? For purposes of this Article, a 
person so acts when he violates a legal duty imposed by the federal 
system to comply with the Court's construction. Quite clearly, this 
definition focuses discussion upon a person's legal obligation within 
the federal system and largely excludes consideration of moral obli-
gations unrecognized by law. Moreover, to define "acting uncon-
stitutionally" in terms of legal duty permits this Article's central 
question to be rephrased: To what extent is the nation under a legal 
duty to comply with a Supreme Court constitutional construction? 
II. Two COMPETING MODELS: JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 
AND VIABLE TENSION 
Two models emerge for determining the binding force of a Su-
preme Court constitutional construction: the "judicial supremacy" 
model and the "viable tension" model. 
A. The Judicial Supremacy Model 
Under the judicial supremacy model, the Supreme Court assumes 
the role of final arbiter within the federal system. In both a literal 
and substantive sense, the Constitution means what the Supreme 
Court says it means. A Supreme Court decision is equated to a law 
of the United States passed "pursuant" to the Constitution and, 
therefore, becomes truly the supreme law of the land.7 
6. In the context of international law, James L. Brierly has offered a thoughtful 
answer to this question: . 
If we are to explain ,vhy any kind of law is binding, we cannot avoid some such 
assumption as that which the Middle Ages made, and which Greece and Rome 
had made before them, when they spoke of natural law. The ultimate explana-
tion of the binding force of all law is that man, whether he is a single individual 
or whether he is associated with other men in a state, is constrained, in so far as 
he is a reasonable being, to believe that order and not chaos is the governing 
principle of the world in which he has to live. 
J. BRIERLY, THE LAw OF NATIONS 55-56 (6th ed. 1963). 
7. France has adopted a judicial supremacy model under the Fifth Republic requir-
1282 Michigan Law Review [Vol. '10:1219 
As applied to another branch of the federal system, the judicial 
supremacy model would impose on that branch a constitutional obli-
gation to comply with a Supreme Court decision, not only with re-
spect to the particular case before the Court, but also with respect to 
all future fact situations raising the same legal issue. Illustratively, if, 
as in Powell v. McCormack,8 the Supreme Court holds that the power 
of Congress to judge the qualification of its elected members is lim-
ited to the qualifications of age, citizenship, and residence expressly 
set forth in the Constitution, then Congress is obligated to accept the 
Court's holding in the Powell case itself and to apply the Powell 
holding in all future fact situations involving congressional exclusion 
of members. Again, if, as in School District of Abington Township 
v. Schempp,9 the Supreme Court holds that a state cannot require 
prayer reading in the public schools, then every public school district 
in the nation is obligated to accept the Court's holding in Schempp 
as the supreme law of the land and to remove state-prescribed prayer 
reading from the public schools as promptly as possible. Thus, under 
the judicial supremacy model, a Supreme Court decision, by its 
own force alone, operates as a rule of law which immediately binds 
the entire nation. 
Predictability is a basic component of justice.10 In shaping his 
conduct, a person needs to know that the legal system will react to 
similar fact situations with reasonable consistency. If the legal system 
is erratic and capricious, justice suffers. Advocates of judicial su-
premacy can argue fairly that their model would instill predictability 
into the federal system. As applied to any fact situation raising a con-
stitutional issue already decided by the Supreme Court, the judicial 
supremacy model would provide a reliable rule for determining what 
the Constitution means. Moreover, all public officials, and private 
citizens as well, would know that they are obligated instantly to shape 
their conduct in accordance with the Supreme Court's construction 
of the Constitution. Viewed prospectively, the Court's construction 
of the Constitution could be changed only by a subsequent Court 
decision or constitutional amendment. This would reduce to a mini-
mum the legal avenues for challenging a Court decision, thereby 
ing that the constitutionality of "organic laws" and "regulations of Parliamentary 
assemblies" must be determined by a constitutional Council before they become 
effective. See CONSTITUTION DU 4 OcrOBRE, art. 61 8: 62 (1958). 
8. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
9. 874 U.S. 208 (1968). 
10. See Justice Harlan's dissent in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 
704-07 (1968), for an expression of concern over the loss of predictability in the law in 
the area of obscenity. 
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contributing to the decision's longevity. To the extent, therefore, 
that predictability within the federal system is a desideratum, the 
judicial supremacy model is calculated ideally to promote it. 
If predictability is a strength of the judicial supremacy model, its 
weakness is partiality. It gives to a Supreme Court decision a legal 
efficacy that no action by any other branch of the federal system can 
claim. All other branches of the federal system can have their actions 
declared unconstitutional by a simple majority of the Supreme 
· Court. By contrast, a Court decision parades through the federal 
system with almost total constitutional immunity; no other branch 
of the federal system can, acting alone, declare the decision uncon-
stitutional. In short, the rest of the federal system is responsible to 
the Supreme Court, but the Court is responsible only to itself and a 
subsequent constitutional amendment. 
Judicial supremacy advocates would argue that various constitu-
tional options exist for challenging a Supreme Court decision and 
that these options blunt sufficiently the vice of partiality. In addition 
to the obvious option of a constitutional amendment,11 the passage 
of time coupled with the election of a new President can produce a 
dramatic change in Court personnel and a concomitant reversal of 
prior Court decisions. Franklin Roosevelt knew this fact well in the 
early years of the New Deal, and Richard Nixon knows it well today. 
Although a change in Court personnel is usually incident to death or 
normal retirement of a Justice, impeachment, or, more accurately, 
its threat, also has a definite role to play in creating Court vacancies.12 
Furthermore, under its power to regulate the Court's appellate juris-
diction, Congress can influence significantly the types of cases that 
reach the Court.13 Thus, the argument runs, the judicial supremacy 
model itself provides ample measures to correct a harmful Supreme 
Court decision. However, none of these measures can reach fruition 
through a simple majority vote of a single branch of government; 
their accomplishment requires substantial time and the action of two 
or more governmental branches. More fundamentally, as to the par-
ties before the Court, none of these measures can affect the validity 
of a Court decision already rendered. Conceptually, therefore, the 
11. U.S. CONST., art. V. A historical example of the constitutional amendment ap-
proach is the eleventh amendment, which was expressly adopted to overrule the 
Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). And, 
although the causal link is less direct, certainly the adoption of the thirteenth and 
fourteenth amendments was motivated partly by a desire to eradicate the Court's 
holding in Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
12. See U.S. CONST., art. I, §§ 2, 8. 
13. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2. 
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judicial supremacy model does confer on the Court a preferred status 
in the federal system. The extent to which this status is justified is, 
of course, the central inquiry of this Article. 
Pressed to its outer limits, the judicial supremacy model could 
create a national climate inimical to political expression regarding 
issues decided by the Court. Assume, for example, that a Supreme 
Court decision was held in such extreme awe that a moral stigma 
would attach to any criticism of the decision or to initiation of any 
political process designed to block the decision's continuing effect. 
Such a climate would emasculate the first amendment guarantees of 
free speech, press, assembly, and petition, in relation to the issues 
resolved by the Court. In opposition to this argument, others might 
contend that judicial supremacy promotes first amendment guaran-
tees as they relate to the broader spectrum of political expression, 
including the multitude of issues not resolved by the Court decision. 
In addition, it appears that moral stigma attaches to criticism of few, 
if any,, decisions by the Court. 
Conceding that judicial supremacy should not emasculate first 
amendment guarantees, a more benign application of the model can 
still dull the cutting edge of political expression. If the Supreme 
Court is the final arbiter of what the Constitution means, a Court 
construction of the Constitution becomes more than an act by one 
branch of the federal government; instead, it carries the oughtness 
potency of the Constitution itself. Thus, under the judicial suprem-
acy model, a Court decision construing the Constitution carries a 
moral suasion not present in acts by other branches of the federal 
system. In a very real sense, to the general public, the Court's deci-
sion is the Constitution. 
If the general public does equate a Supreme Court decision with 
the Constitution, this places those who wish to challenge the decision 
at a tactical disadvantage. Proponents of the Court's decision can 
label any attempt to block its continuing effect as an attack on rights 
which "the Constitution" now confers. Wrapped in the mantle of the 
Constitution, the Court's decision is presumed rebuttably to be 
"good." It is impossible to assess the extent to which this halo of 
oughtness inhibits criticism of a Court decision and, more impor-
tantly, the use of the political process to blunt the decision's continu-
ing effect.14 In some instances, the inhibitory impact is palpable; in 
14. L. Brent Bozell has suggested: 
If it is true that a construction of the Constitution by the Supreme Court, no 
matter how spurious or absurd, no matter how damaging to the organic life of 
the country, is eo ipso "the law of the land," unchallengeable even by a law made 
by the people's representatives; if it is true that a "constitutional right" can come 
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others, it is minimal.15 Whatever the degree of inhibition, its exis-
tence should be incorporated as a negative factor into any evaluation 
of the judicial supremacy model. 
Historically, the Supreme Court has made only infrequent pro-
nouncements on the binding effect of its own decisions; generally; its 
concerns have lain elsewhere. Thus, in Marbury v. Madison,16 the 
Court's main concern was to establish its right to exercise the power 
of judicial review, the power to judge the constitutionality of acts 
by other branches of the federal system. In contrast to its dicta, the 
Marbury holding was calculated precisely to avoid a confrontation 
with the Jeffersonian Republicans and said nothing about the legal 
impact of a Supreme Court decision upon the rest of the nation. In 
effect, Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury told the nation only this: 
No other branch of the federal system can thrust upon the federal 
judiciary an act which this Court declares unconstitutional. Without 
demeaning the importance of this pronouncement, it does not at-
tempt to fix the nation's obligation to comply with a Supreme Court 
decision. Viewed accurately, Marbury did nothing more than create 
the issue that this Article will attempt to resolve. 
In the 1958 case of Cooper v. Aaron,11 the Supreme Court dis-
agreed with the preceding analysis of Marbury. In Cooper, violence 
and disorder generated by actions of the Arkansas governor and legis-
lature impeded implementation of a public school desegregation 
program in Little Rock, Arkansas; the program had been formulated 
by the Little Rock school board and approved by the lower federal 
courts. The Supreme Court held that the state-generated violence 
and disorder did not justify postponement of the desegregation pro-
gram. On these facts, the Court's holding is unexceptionable, in-
volving only the proposition that state governments cannot interfere 
into being merely on the Court's say, so that every corrective constitutional amend-
ment can plausibly be represented as an attempt to deprive the people of their 
previously vested constitutional rights (and thus easily defeated)-then, where, 
in all candor, are we? If a judicial interpretation of the Constitution is, by 
definition, the Constitution, wliy then we are in the grips of a judicial despotism. 
That is the meaning of despotism. An unchallengeable authority can be benign, 
or malevolent, but it is a despotism if the rest of the commonwealth has no 
practical alternative to succumbing to its will. 
L. BoZELL, THE WARREN REvoLUTION 111-12 (1966). While not subscribing to Bozell's use 
of the term "judicial despotism" as characterizing the normal application of the 
judicial supremacy model, I believe his language does illustrate forcibly the dangers 
flowing from the model's unrestrained application. 
15. See Stumpf, The Political Efficacy of Judicial Symbolism, in THE IMPACT OF 
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 58-59 (T. Becker ed. 1969), for a discussion of potential effects 
of the Court's prestige on reversal attempts by Congress. 
16. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
17. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
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·with the enforcement of specific federal court decisions.18 As will be 
detailed later, any other holding would produce intolerable chaos in 
the federal system. Much more challenging is the Court's dicta con-
cerning Marbury. Responding to the contention that the Arkansas 
governor and legislature were not bound by the Court's holding in 
Brown v. Board of Education,19 the Court in Cooper stated: 
Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the "su-
preme Law of the Land." In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking 
for a unanimous Court, referring to the Constitution as "the funda-
mental and paramount law of the nation," declared in the notable 
case of Marbury v. Madison, ••• that "It is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." This 
decision declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is 
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that 
principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Coun-
try as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional 
system. It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law 
of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect 
on the States "any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State 
to the Contrary notwithstanding."20 
Clearly, the Court here is equating its construction of the Con-
stitution to the supreme law of the land. In so doing, the Court is 
advocating the judicial supremacy model. It is not unnatural for the 
Court to select the model that most strengthens its position in the 
federal system. But it is hoped that the Court's preference for judi-
cial supremacy does not foreclose further inquiry into the matter. 
More seriously, the Court's dicta in Cooper imputes to Marbury a 
holding on a question that Marshall studiously avoided: the extent 
to which a Court decision binds the nation. To place this question in 
18. The Court cited United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809), for the 
proposition that a state legislator or executive may not constitutionally annul the 
judgment of a federal court, and Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932), for the 
same principle in respect to state governors. 
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
20. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). See also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 360 n.12 
(1970) CTustice Harlan, concurring): 
I cannot, moreover, accept the view, implicit in the dissent, that Congress has any 
ultimate responsibility for construing tlie Constitution. It, like all other branches 
of government, is constricted by the Constitution and must conform its action to 
it. It is this Court, however, and not the Congress that is ultimately charged 
with the difficult responsibility of construing the First Amendment. 
At least in the first amendment area, Justice Harlan supported the judicial supremacy 
model. While according to Congress greater power in the conscientious objector area 
than Justice Harlan was willing to grant, Justice White, dissenting in Welsh, 398 U.S. 
at 371, concludes: "This involves no surrender of the Court's function as ultimate 
arbiter in disputes over interpretation of the Constitution." Thus, like Justice Harlan, 
Justice White supports the judicial supremacy model as advanced by the Court in 
Cooper. 
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sharper focus requires a description and analysis of the viable tension 
model. 
B. The Viable Tension Model 
In its pristine state, the viable tension model21 accords no bind-
ing force to a Supreme Court decision; standing alone, a Court 
decision obligates no one. The decision may command respect. ft 
may even be followed by the rest of the nation. But until supported 
by another branch of the federal system, the decision has no legal 
effect. It remains a weighty, but nonobligatory, pronouncement by 
one branch of the federal government. 
As applied to another branch of the federal system, the viable 
tension model would impose on that branch no constitutional obli-
gation to comply with a Supreme Court decision. This lack of obli-
gation would extend to the particular case before the Court and, a 
fortiori, to all future fact situations raising the same legal issue. It 
would extend even to a case in which the branch itself is substan-
tively a party to the proceedings before the Court. Referring again to 
Powell v. McCormack,22 assume that the Court, in a subsequent pro-
ceeding, holds that Powell is entitled to receive the compensation 
withheld from him during the two years he was excluded from Con-
gress. Under the viable tension model, Congress would have no obli-
gation to implement this decision. More defiantly, Congress would 
have the right to act affirmatively to prevent its fiscal agents from 
paying Powell. As to future fact situations involving congressional 
exclusion, Congress would have the right to ignore the Court's con-
struction of the Constitution in Powell and to judge the qualifica-
tions of its elected members on bases other than age, citizenship, and 
residence. 
Applying the viable tension model to state-prescribed prayer in 
the public schools, the Supreme Court's decision in School District 
of Abington Township v. Schempp23 would, standing alone, impose 
no constitutional obligation on any school district not a party to 
Schempp and related cases. In its purest form, the logic of viable 
21. The idea of things existing in a state of viable tension is not new. In describing 
the world view of the Greek philosopher Heraclitus, Bertrand Russell notes: "[He] de-
velops a new theory from these ingredients, and this is his signal discovery and contribu-
tion to philosophy: the real world consists in a balanced adjustment of opposing 
tendencies. Behind the strife between opposites, according to measures, there lies a 
hidden harmony or attunement which is the world." B. RUSSELL, WISDOM OF THE WE.Sr 
24 (P. Foulkes ed. 1959). 
22. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
23. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). , . 1 
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tension would shield even the Abington School District itself. This 
latter extension would, of course, wreck the federal system; realis-
tically, therefore, attention should center on the nicer problem of 
the nonparty school districts. Here the viable tension model would 
allow these districts to continue state-prescribed prayer in the public 
schools until enjoined specifically by court order. Technically, the 
very nature of judicial power24 would suggest that only the parties 
to a lawsuit are bound by the Court's decree. For reasons to be ad-
vanced later, however, this view of the effect of a judicial pronounce-
ment, as applied to the legislative and executive branches of the state 
governments, should yield to the countervailing postulate of federal 
supremacy. For present descriptive purposes, it is enough to say 
only this: With respect to a Supreme Court constitutional construc-
tion that stands alone, the viable tension model would authorize 
each remaining branch of the federal system to adopt its own version 
of the Constitution. 
Different reasons exist for rejecting a Supreme Court decision. 
A person may accept the decision as a correct interpretation of the 
Constitution but reject it as unwise; he may claim that the decision 
involves erroneous statutory construction or improper conclusions 
of fact. The viable tension model is not concerned with these reasons 
for rejection. Concretely, the viable tension model authorizes 
Congress to interfere with a specific Court decision only if Congress 
believes that the decision is based on an incorrect construction of 
the Constitution. If Congress accepts the Court's construction of the 
Constitution and believes merely that the decision is unwise, 
Congress has no right to interfere with the decision's implementation 
in the particular case. These principles would also apply to all other 
branches of the federal system. As to future fact situations raising 
the same legal issue, the same limitation applies: The right of 
Congress or any other branch of the federal system to reject a Court 
construction of the Constitution would be conditioned on belief 
that the Court's construction is wrong. Here, however, the limitation 
is, in the case of congressional rejection, more technical than real. 
If, for example, Congress believes that a Court decision is based solely 
on erroneous construction of a federal statute, the viable tension 
24. In Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356 (1911), the Court quoted Justice 
Miller's I.EcTuRF.s ON THE CONmTIJTION OF THE UNITED STATES 314 (1891) for the propo• 
sition that "'Judicial Power ••• is the power of a court to decide and pronounce a 
judgment and carry it into effect between persons and parties who bring a case before 
it for decision.'" (Emphasis added.) Although not directly on point, this definition sug• 
gests by negative inference that judicial power has no legal effect on persons and 
entities not parties to the litigation. 
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model would not be operative, but Congress need only amend the 
statute to mold future fact situations in accordance with its will.25 
Thus, the model's triggering condition of disagreement on constitu-
tional construction has meaning largely as a limitation on the 
nation's right to interfere with the implementation of a Supreme 
Court decision already rendered. 
Even with respect to implementation of a decision already 
rendered, how meaningful is the limitation? The skeptic would 
argue that there is no magic in words; that, for example, if Congress 
wants to block implementation of a specific Court decision, Congress 
need only mask its true reason for so doing in the guise of a dis-
agreement on constitutional construction; that there is no realistic 
check on the power of Congress to characterize deceptively its reason 
for rejecting a Court decision.26 The skeptic's argument is superficial 
if it ignores the role of oughtness in shaping human conduct. A 
nation's conception of oughtness does make a difference. Ultimately, 
it is the very thing that makes a legal system work.27 If the bulk 
of Americans believed that laws in general ought to be disobeyed, 
the legal system would collapse. Viewed accurately, therefore, a 
nation's conception of oughtness may well influence the fl.ow of 
power within a political system more profoundly than any other 
factor. Returning to the congressional example, if nearly all Congress-
men believe that Congress ought to reject a Court decision only on 
the basis of a disagreement on constitutional construction, this par-
ticular conception of oughtness will become the prevailing reality;28 
25. While not precisely on point, congressional enactment of Title I of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1970), may have been partially motivated by 
Supreme Court criticism of an earlier civil rights statute, 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970). This 
earlier statute, in general terms only, protected federally created rights against private 
conspiracies. In his concurring opinion in United States v. Guest, 283 U.S. 745, 785-86 
(1966), Justice Brennan commented: "Section 241 is certainly not model legislation for 
punishing private conspiracies to interfere with the exercise of the right of equal utiliza-
tion of state facilities •••• [I]f Congress desires to give the statute more definite scope, it 
may find ways of doing so." In Title I of the 1968 Act, Congress did "find ways" "to give 
the statute more definite scope" by specifically listing those federally created rights 
which are protected against both governmental and private interference. This illustrates 
the interplay that often occurs between Congress and the Court in the formulation and 
construction of statutes. 
26. As a counterthrust to such action by Congress, the Court can also play the game 
of deceptive characterization. To avoid the operation of viable tension, the Court could 
cast its decision in terms of statutory construction or fact resolution instead of con-
stitutional construction. In the final analysis, only the good sense of Congress and the 
Court can prevent the technique of deceptive characterization from being carried to 
ludicrous extremes. 
27. See note 6 supra. 
28. Whetl1er in fact nearly all Congressmen do accept this belief is a question that 
I do not attempt to answer. My analysis attempts only to show the impact of this 
belief if it were the prevailing norm. Shifting to the federal executive, my rebuttal 
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Congress will eschew a rejection based on other reasons. Nor does it 
weak.en this analysis to admit readily that in times of stress one 
conception of oughtness may yield to a different and more com-
pelling conception of oughtness. That revolution, for example, may 
overthrow a legal system in its entirety does not enfeeble a national 
belief that laws in general ought to be obeyed. Accordingly, this 
paragraph's basic proposition still holds: A national belief that 
implementation of a Court decision should be blocked only for a 
specified reason would far transcend the possibility of deceptive 
characterization; the belief would generate in time a potent con-
formity in practice. 
Turning to another facet of viable tension, the model is con-
cerned primarily with the nation's obligation to comply with a 
Supreme Court decision that stands alone, unsupported by any other 
branch of the federal system. If one or more of the system's remaining 
branches, particularly Congress or the federal executive, support 
the decision, the question of the decision's binding effect assumes a 
new dimension. For in this setting, opposition to the decision is 
more than opposition to a single branch of the federal government; 
rather, it is opposition to the decision as re-enforced by other parts 
of the federal system. This distinction becomes especially important 
in considering the extent to which a Court decision binds the execu-
tive and legislative branches of the state governments. Here, as will 
be developed later, if both Congress and the federal executive support 
the Court decision, a strong federal supremacy argument, unavail-
able while the decision stands alone, enters the fray.2° For the 
present, it is enough to stress generally the distinction between a 
Court decision that stands alone and a decision supported by some 
other part of the federal system, a distinction that this Article will 
use to reconcile the clashing policy vectors of the viable tension and 
judicial supremacy models. 
In relation to a Supreme Court decision, the viable tension model 
provides generous opportunity for political expression. Quite ob-
viously, if a Court decision, standing alone, binds no one, criticism 
of the decision can flourish, uninhibited by any substantial risk of 
moral stigma. Equally important, a vigorous adherence to viable 
tension would encourage the unfettered use of the political process 
of the skeptic's argument may be less persuasive in that a single "renegade" President 
is not subject to the same group controls as a maverick Congressman. Conversely, sup-
porting my rebuttal is the fact that a sensible Congress and federal executive arc as 
capable as the Court of exercising the restraint necessary to avoid needless friction over 
issues of constitutional construction. 
29. See text accompanying notes 98-108 infra. 
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to thwart the decision's command. Thus, the model would further 
"a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on 
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open .... "30 
Moreover, by promoting freedom of expression in relation to Court 
decisions, viable tension would remove these decisions from the 
pedestal occupied by the Constitution; the confusing blur between a 
Court decision and the Constitution would vanish. Whatever its 
faults, the viable tension model would be at least a sure defense 
against judicial idolatry. 
The viable tension model also avoids the vice of partiality among 
the various branches of the federal system. Although the model does 
not affect the Supreme Court's right to declare acts by other branches 
of the federal system unconstitutional, it gives to each of these other 
branches a reciprocal right to declare acts by the Supreme Court 
unconstitutional. To the extent, therefore, that justice compre-
hends equality, viable tension is just. Admittedly, this stated virtue 
of equality somewhat begs the question, for the central inquiry of 
this Article is precisely the extent to which such equality is required 
by the Constitution. Perhaps the only true virtue of viable tension's 
impartiality is that it re-enforces freedom of expression in relation 
to Court decisions and a concomitant attitude of healthy skepticism 
toward the myth of Court infallibility.31 
If viable tension advances freedom of expression in relation to a 
Supreme Court construction of the Constitution, it correspondingly 
creates a pervasive uncertainty within the federal system. For, 
should each remaining branch of the system exercise its "viable 
tension right" to adopt a constitutional construction differing from 
the Court's, the resultant clash of competing constructions would 
obliterate the Constitution's functional meaning. Battered by con-
flicting "ought" statements, the citizen would have no reliable 
guide for conforming his conduct to constitutional commands. Thus, 
viable tension would remove from the federal system the predict-
ability that judicial supremacy would preserve. Not the Supreme 
Court, but the vicissitudes of political power would determine the 
30. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964). 
31. 
• • • [T]he Supreme Court in American society, which Arnold terms "our most 
important symbol of government,'' continues to be regarded as the font of im-
partiality and legitimacy, of near-infallibility amidst the chaos of conflicting 
notions of legality. And even among those writers who are fond of emphasizing 
the policymaking or "political" role of the Court (often along with a description of 
its liistoncal foibles) one is still likely to find references to the awe and reverence in 
which the Court is held-to the magic or sacrosanctity of the Court and its per-
sonnel. 
Stumpf, supra note 15, at 48. 
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prevailing constitutional construction; a type of constitutional 
Danvinism would suffuse the nation. 
Would this suffusion be necessarily bad? Viable tension advocates 
would argue that their model reflects accurately the flow of power 
within the federal system. They would stress that each of us has 
initially the power to disobey a Supreme Court decision, a congres-
sional act, or any other governmental command. Accordingly, a Court 
decision, like an act of Congress, has efficacy only to the extent that 
we are compelled by superior force to obey it. Why not, therefore, 
let obligation follow power? Less abstractly, why not say that a person 
is obligated to comply with a Court construction of the Constitution 
only if compelled to do so? By thus wedding obligation to power, 
viable tension avoids the anomaly of an obligation hanging im-
potently in limbo. 
The wedding of obligation to power also produces harmful 
results. To reject totally the role of oughtness within a legal system 
is to make compulsion the determinant of individual commitment 
to law. This is the great danger of the pure viable tension model. By 
promoting a nationwide belief that individuals may legally ignore 
Supreme Court decisions until compelled to obey them, the model 
would generate toward these decisions an attitude of inertia, waxing 
through increasingly ominous stages of disrespect and open defiance. 
Moreover, if individuals must be dragged en masse into sullen 
compliance with Court decisions, an erosion of the nation's law 
enforcement energies would follow. And, looming behind that prac-
tical consequence is the jugular threat of anarchy. If unrestrained, 
viable tension invites inexorably a societal condition where "[t]hings 
fall apart; the centre cannot hold."32 
III. THE MODELS .APPLmp TO THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
Judicial supremacy and viable tension are each a mixed blessing. 
Both models contain strengths and weaknesses; if applied absolutely, 
each model becomes untenable. Accordingly, an operable federal 
system requires some degree of reconciliation between the competing 
models. To determine the degree of reconciliation required, this 
section will apply the competing models to the several parts of the 
federal system. 
As this application is made, a number of policy considerations 
will affect the choice between the competing models. The wording 
32. w. B. Yeats, The Second Coming, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF w. B. YEATS 184 
(3d ed. 1956). 
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of the Constitution is a policy consideration of paramount im-
portance. If the constitutional mandate is clear and specific, it creates 
expectations in the nation that should not be ignored. To distort a 
constitutional provision of patent clarity invites the growth of 
cynicism among those subject to the Constitution's commands. 
Although many constitutional provisions lack patent clarity, the 
search £or a "textually demonstrable constitutional"33 mandate must 
still be made. The Constitution may indeed be a living document 
whose commands are shaped by the exigencies of society, but this 
concept of organic growth has not displaced totally the need £or 
constitutional exegesis. Ascertaining the meaning of the Constitution 
requires more than taking a Gallup poll of the nation's current 
desires. 
A second policy consideration involves predictability. A person 
needs to know where he stands legally in relation to the system that 
governs him.34 This need is urgent with respect to the government 
decision-maker who must react to a pronouncement by another 
branch of government; it is even more urgent with respect to those 
whose lives are affected directly by the decision-maker's reaction. 
Accordingly, as the judicial supremacy and viable tension models 
are applied to the federal system, an "urgency of predictability" 
factor will also be considered in determining the obligation of each 
governmental branch to comply with a Supreme Court decision. The 
greater the need £or predictability, the more readily should an im-
mediate obligation to comply be found to exist.35 
A third policy consideration involves opportunity £or political 
endeavor. A political system should encourage orderly change 
through legitimate channels. This requires a system that is respon-
sive and that contains within its framework a wide diversity of means 
for accomplishing orderly change. A narrow, rigid system stifles 
individual and collective initiative; within such a system, creative 
political reform becomes very difficult. Thus, as the competing 
models are applied to the several parts of the federal system, they 
must be judged in each application on the basis of their tendency 
to expand or constrict legitimate avenues of political endeavor. 
33. This phrase appears in the Court's opinion in :Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 
(1962). 
34. See note 10 supra and accompanying text. 
35. Related to the policy factor of predictability is the argument that the Supreme 
Court is in a better position than any other branch of the federal system to function 
as the final arbiter on questions of constitutional construction. This argument is con-
sidered more fully in my discussion of the application of the competing models to the 
legislative and executive branches of the federal government. See text accompanying 
note 66 infra. 
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There may be a compelling need to preserve a particular govern-
mental branch as a free agent in relation to a Supreme Court de-
cision, as an unfettered avenue for political effort designed to blunt 
the decision's continuing effect. Such a need would militate against 
an obligation to comply instantly with the decision.116 
A final policy consideration involves the relationship between 
obligation and power. Although power realities within the federal 
system should not determine conclusively the boundaries of legal 
obligation, these realities affect legal obligation significantly. If 
obligation and power clash continually, "it is evident, the machine 
is working in a way the framers of it did not intend."a7 Nor can any 
political system long endure a gaping divergence between obligation 
and power. With the passage of time, the definition of legal obligation 
will yield to the realities of power, or the realities of power will 
conform to the definition of legal obligation. Contrarily, a persisting 
divergence between obligation and power can destroy the conception 
of oughtness that holds a nation together. Hence, the competing 
models of judicial supremacy and viable tension must not be applied 
in a manner which stretches the divergence between obligation and 
power to the breaking point; the analytical task is reconciliation.38 
A. The Lower Federal Courts 
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish.89 
The judge of a lower federal court should be obligated to comply 
instantly with a Supreme Court construction of the Constitution. 
36. Related to the policy factor of opportunity for political endeavor is the argu-
ment that judicial supremacy is anti-democratic in nature in that it operates contrary 
to the principle of majority rule. See note 74 and the accompanying text infra. In 
rebuttal, many jurists and writers have contended that in a democratic society, the 
Supreme Court has a special role to play in the protection of minority rights against 
the passions of the majority. See the oft-quoted footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene 
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938), in which Justice Stone stated that "prejudice 
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition ••• which may call 
for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." 
37. Eakin v. Raub, 12 S. 8: R. 330, 350 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1825) (Gibson, J., dissenting). 
Justice Gibson's dissent contains an elaborate attack on the doctrine of judicial review. 
While his arguments have been overwhelmed by the experience of history, the quoted 
phrase aptly describes the dangers for a political system of a persisting divergence 
between obligation and power. 
38. The four policy factors listed in this section are probably not exhaustive of the 
policy factors relevant to the choice between judicial supremacy and viable tension, 
Hopefully, however, nearly all factors bearing upon this choice can be related rea-
sonably to one or more of these four factors. 
39. u.s. CoNsr., art. m, § 1. 
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Here, if nowhere else in the federal system, the judicial supremacy 
model should be applied vigorously. In this area, any weakening of 
judicial supremacy would undermine irreparably the Supreme 
Court's appellate power over the lower federal courts. 
At this level, all policy considerations point strongly toward 
judicial supremacy. The Constitution states clearly that the lower 
federal courts are to be "inferior"40 to the Supreme Court; such 
inferiority clashes syntactically with the right to reject a Supreme 
Court decision. Thus, the wording of the Constitution creates the 
expectation that lower federal courts will not engage in internecine 
war with the Supreme Court. 
Moreover, in relation to a Supreme Court decision, the need for 
a predictable reaction by the lower federal courts is urgent. Persons 
affected by the federal judiciary need to know that lower federal 
court judges will attempt fairly and conscientiously to apply Supreme 
Court decisions. Thus, it would be anomalous for a federal district 
court judge to reject the holding in Brown v. Board of Education41 
because he prefers the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. 
Ferguson.42 For such an attitude to pervade the federal courts would 
produce judicial chaos; its unsettling effect on federal court litigants 
and the federal system in general would be intolerable. Whatever 
difficulties are involved in construing and applying what the 
Supreme Court has said, lower federal court judges should regard 
themselves as obligated to make the attempt,43 and this obligation 
should extend, upon remand, to the particular case before the 
Supreme Court and to all future cases raising the same legal issue. 
As a further consideration, there is no particular urgency that 
lower federal courts serve as a vehicle for political endeavor designed 
to blunt the continuing effect of a Supreme Court decision. If there 
is to be such a vehicle, other branches of the federal system can 
perform this function better. Traditionally, the nation has looked 
to the legislative and executive branches of government as more 
appropriate conduits for battling the Supreme Court. To enlist 
40. U.S. CoNsr., art. I, § 8. 
41. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
42. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
43. To what extent may lower federal courts anticipate in their decisions that the 
Supreme Court will overrule a former precedent? See Spector Motor Serv. Inc. v. Walsh, 
139 F.2d 809 (2d Cir.), vacated sub nom. Spector Motor Serv. Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 
U.S. 101 (1944), for the contrasting views of Judges Clark at 814- and Hand (dissenting) 
at 823 on this issue. See Barnette v. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251, 
252-53 (S.D. W. Va. 1942), afjd., 319 U.S. 624 (1943) for an example of a lower federal 
court decision which expressly anticipates that the Supreme Court will overrule a 
former precedent. 
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lower federal courts for this purpose would promote only political 
redundancy. 
Finally, to accord lower federal courts a "viable tension" right 
to reject Supreme Court decisions would strain unduly the relation-
ship between obligation and power within the federal system. Re-
bellious federal judges would continually necessitate the application 
of federal legislative and executive power to insure the fair enforce-
ment of Supreme Court decisions in the lower federal courts. No 
countervailing policy is of such strength as to justify this wasteful 
use of federal enforcement energies. If applied to the federal judi-
ciary, the viable tension model would involve lower federal courts in 
acts of unseemly futility or, more ominously, would make a shambles 
of the federal judicial system envisioned by the Constitution. 
B. The State Courts 
In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall 
have appellate Jurisdiction, ... 44 
Ever since Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,45 decided at an early date in 
the nation's history, the view has prevailed that the state courts do 
have concurrent jurisdiction ·with the federal courts over cases in-
volving a "federal question"46 or, more technically, cases "arising 
under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority.''47 
As a concomitant of state court jurisdiction over federal question 
cases, the Supreme Court held in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee48 that 
Congress had the power to grant to the Supreme Court appellate 
jurisdiction over federal question cases originating in the state 
courts. Building on the arguments advanced by Alexander Hamilton 
in The Federalist No. 82, Justice Story found textual support for 
this holding in the article III clause that grants to the Supreme Court 
appellate jurisdiction "in all the other Cases before mentioned.''49 
If these "other Cases" include federal question cases, and if the state 
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over federal question cases, then, 
reasoned Story, the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court can 
be extended constitutionally to federal question cases originating 
· in the state courts. In the words of Hamilton: "The objects of appeal, 
44. U.S. CoNsr., art. ID, § 2. 
45. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
46. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 339-41. 
47. U.S. CoNsr., art. m, § 2. 
48. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
49. 14 U.S. (I Wheat,) at 338-39, quoting U.S. CoNsr., art. III, § 2. 
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not the tribunals from which it is to be made, are alone con-
templated."50 
That the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over federal 
question cases originating in the state courts is thus a premise rooted 
firmly in history, the wording of the Constitution, and in judicial 
authority. Indeed, the premise continues today as a crucial linchpin 
of the federal system. Accepting the premise, the state courts then 
become an integral part of the federal judicial system precisely to 
the extent that they entertain federal question cases.51 More rele-
vantly, in federal question cases the state courts are in precisely the 
same position relative to the Supreme Court as the lower federal 
courts. Accordingly, every policy argument used to support an ap-
plication of the judicial supremacy model to the lower federal courts 
can be used ·with equal efficacy to support the application of the same 
model to the state courts. 
The judicial supremacy model should, therefore, be applied to 
the state courts in full strength. To concede to the state courts a 
viable tension right to reject a Supreme Court construction of the 
Constitution would, as in the case of the lower federal courts, conflict 
dramatically with the Supreme Court's appellate power. In Justice 
Story's words, the federal judicial system should be free of "jarring 
and discordant judgments."52 As concerns the state courts, only a 
robust application of judicial supremacy will enable the Supreme 
Court, in the resolution of federal questions, to achieve an approxi-
mate uniformity throughout the federal judicial system. State court 
judges should be obligated to comply instantly with a Supreme Court 
construction of the Constitution. Within the framework of the fed-
eral judicial system, the Supreme Court should be indeed supreme. 
C. The Legislative and Executive Branches 
of the Federal Government 
Well: John Marshall has made his decision: now let him enforce 
it153 
50. THE FEDERALisr No. 82, at 536 (Modern Library Ed. 1937) (Hamilton). 
51. The role of the state courts as a part of the federal judicial system is highlighted 
in article VI of the Constitution: "and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby 
(the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States], any thing in the Constitution 
or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." 
52. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 348. 
53. Statement attributed to President Jackson by George N. Briggs of Massachu-
setts. Briggs was serving as a member of Congress at the time Jackson allegedly made 
the statement in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). H. GREELEY, THE AMERICAN CONFLICT 106 n2.7 (1864). 
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In 1830, the state of Georgia passed a law making it a crime for 
any white person to reside "within the limits of the Cherokee nation" 
without the consent of the governor of Georgia. 54 Shortly thereafter, 
in 1831, Samuel A. Worcester engaged in missionary activities among 
the Cherokees without the Georgia governor's consent. Accordingly, 
Worcester was arrested by Georgia officials, tried in a Georgia state 
court, and convicted of violating the 1830 act; as provided by the 
act, he was then sentenced to "hard labor" in the state penitentiary 
for a term of four years. 55 
In Worcester v. Georgia,56 Worcester appealed his conviction to 
the United States Supreme Court. In 1832, in an opinion by Chief 
Justice Marshall, the Court reversed Worcester's conviction, holding 
that the 1830 Georgia act and hence Worcester's conviction were 
unconstitutional because they conflicted with then existing treaties 
between the United States and the Cherokee nation. Pursuant to 
this holding, the Supreme Court ordered 
that all proceedings on the said indictment [of Worcester] do for 
ever surcease; and that the said Samuel A. Worcester be and hereby 
is henceforth dismissed therefrom, and that he go thereof quit, 
without day [sic]. And that a special mandate do go from this court, 
to the said [Georgia] superior court, to carry this judgment into exe-
cution.57 
When the attorneys for Worcester sought enforcement of the Supreme 
Court's judgment, President Jackson refused to execute it. According 
to Horace Greeley, it is then that Jackson challenged Marshall in 
the words quoted at the beginning of this subsection. And so, Greeley 
concluded, Worcester "languished years in prison ... in defiance of 
the mandate of our highest judicial tribunal."58 
Worcester illustrates dramatically the Supreme Court's depen-
dence upon the federal executive for the execution of its judgments. 
More generally, without the support of the co-ordinate branches of 
the federal government, a Supreme Court decision is impotent, a 
mere pronouncement and nothing more. Concededly, a series of 
Court decisions may generate political pressures which eventually 
influence Congress and the federal executive in the Court's direction; 
but unless these two branches conform promptly to a Court decision, 
54. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 523. 
55. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 532. 
56. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515. 
57. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 597. 
58. H. GREELEY, supra note 53, at 106. See Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in 
Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REv. 500 (1969), for a recent discussion of 
Worcester. 
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a ·wide divergence between power-as exercised by Congress and 
the federal executive, and obligation-as defined by the Court deci-
sion, will persist for a substantial period of time. This divergence 
does not preclude application of the judicial supremacy model to 
the co-ordinate branches of the federal government, nor does it 
dictate automatic application of the viable tension model. It does 
mean that here the choice between the competing models is more 
difficult to make than in the case of the federal and state judiciaries. 
The Constitution does not expressly grant to the Supreme Court 
the power of judicial review.59 To support the exercise of judicial 
review in Marbury v. Madison,60 Marshall had to reason by im-
plication. Even less does the Constitution define the extent to which 
a Supreme Court decision binds the nation. This is particularly true 
in regard to the decision's binding effect on Congress and the federal 
executive. Here, the most diligent search will yield no hint of any 
constitutional mandate; on this issue, the Constitution is superbly 
silent. Its wording equally supports the application of judicial 
supremacy or viable tension to the co-ordinate branches of the 
federal government. Moreover, why not select Congress or the federal 
executive as the ultimate decision-maker among the three branches 
of the federal government?61 Nothing in the Constitution attaches 
greater potency to a Supreme Court decision than to a decision of 
Congress or the federal executive. Viewed from any perspective, 
the appeal to constitutional exegesis is inconclusive. 62 
Indeed, any inference drawn from the Constitution's wording 
would favor viable tension among the three branches of the federal 
59. Concerning the intent of the framers of the Constitution on the issue of judicial 
review, Leonard W. Levy quotes Edward S. Convin: 
• • • in blunt language he declared, "The people who say the framers intended 
it are talking nonsense"- to which he hastily added, "and the people who say they 
did not intend it are talking nonsense." In the same vein he remarked, there is 
"great uncertainty." A close textual and contextual examination of the evidence 
will not result in an improvement on these propositions. 
Levy, Judicial Review, History, and Democracy: An Introduction, in JUDICIAL REvmw 
AND THE SUFREME COURT 4 (L. Levy ed. 1967). 
60. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Marshall's reasoning relied heavily on arguments 
advanced by Hamilton in THE FEDERALIST No. 78. 
61. Indeed, Great Britain exemplifies a governmental system operating under a 
model of parliamentary supremacy. If the choice lay only between legislative or execu-
tive supremacy, British history strongly supports the former. In a representative form 
of government, legislative supremacy would appear to be the surer shield against 
totalitarian government. For reasons advanced in the text accompanying note 66 infra, 
on matters of constitutional construction, I would choose judicial supremacy over 
legislative or executive supremacy. 
62. See A. BICKEL, THE L1i:AsT DANGEROUS BRANCH 5-6 (1962), for a discussion of the 
ambiguity of the Constitution concerning the function of the Supreme Court in the 
feaeral system. 
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government. If anything, the Constitution's first three articles con-
note equality among the three branches. Such equality is more con-
sistent with a viable tension right in each branch to construe the 
Constitution independently than with an obligation on the part of 
two branches to comply instantly with a constitutional construction 
by the third branch. Nor can judicial supremacy draw support from 
the allocation of powers among the three branches. Viewed thusly, 
Hamilton's description of the judiciary as the "least dangerous"03 
branch is apt. Syntactically, Congress and the federal executive boast 
far greater powers. I£ judicial supremacy is to prevail among the 
three branches of the federal government, it must find support else-
where than in the express wording of the Constitution. 
The judicial supremacy model would require Congress and the 
federal executive to comply instantly with a Supreme Court decision. 
Under this model, the reaction of Congress and the federal executive 
to a Court decision would be highly predictable. If this meets an 
urgent need, on that basis alone judicial supremacy might well carry 
the day. But how urgent is the need? In some respects, predictability 
of reaction to a Court decision would be a strongly harmonizing 
factor among the three branches of the federal government. For 
example, when the Court speaks, the individual Congressman or 
federal executive officer would know what reaction is expected of 
him in his official capacity. Additionally, persons affected directly 
by the reaction of Congress and the federal executive to a Court 
decision would know what that reaction ought to entail. More 
particularly, litigants asserting rights established by a Court decision 
would know that Congress and the federal executive should fairly 
enforce those rights. Undoubtedly, these several conceptions of 
oughtness would instill greater stability into the federal system. But 
the crucial question recurs. Is this greater stability indispensable? 
Can the federal system function without it? 
Some observers have stated that in relation to the co-ordinate 
branches of the federal government, not even the power of judicial 
review is an indispensable part of the federal system. This thought 
is compressed neatly into Justice Holmes' well-knO'wn statement: 
"I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost 
our power to declare an act of Congress void. I do think that the 
Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as 
to the laws of the several states."64 On the issue of judicial review, 
63. Tm: FEDERALIST No. 78 at 504 (Modern Library Ed. 1937) (Hamilton). In other 
words, if supremacy turned upon the scope and potency of powers granted under the 
Constitution, Congress and the executive branch would clearly prevail over the Court. 
64. 0. HoLllras, Law and the Court, in CoLLECl'ED LEGAL PAPERS 291, 295-96 (1920), 
June 1972] Judicial Supremacy Re-examined 1301 
Holm.es' statement recognizes a hierarchy of urgency among the 
several parts of the federal system. By analogy, the same hier-
archy of urgency would exist on the issue of a Supreme Court deci-
sion's binding effect. One who can envision a federal system without 
judicial review should have no difficulty in envisioning a system in 
which a Supreme Court decision, while binding on the federal 
judiciary, has no binding effect on Congress and the federal execu-
tive. 
Paradoxically, the existence of judicial review supports the ap-
plication of viable tension to the co-ordinate branches of the federal 
government. Judicial review enables the Supreme Court to protect 
its own sphere of action, to act as master of its house. More techni-
cally, judicial review empowers the Court to determine which acts 
by the remaining parts of the federal system will be recognized 
within the framework of the federal judiciary. This, arguably, is 
judicial review's primary function.65 So viewed, why is there not an 
equal need for "congressional review" and "presidential review"? 
As co-equal branches of the federal government, Congress and the 
federal executive should have the power to protect their respective 
spheres of action from what they regard as unconstitutional encroach-
ment by the Supreme Court. In this game of clashing spheres, why 
is the urgency any greater for Congress and the federal executive to 
bow before the Supreme Court than for the bows to be reversed? 
Every argument using predictability as a basis for adopting judicial 
supremacy can be used equally to support congressional or presi-
dential supremacy; the triangle of competing urgencies lies flat on a 
horizontal plane. 
If, on the issue of constitutional construction, we must stand the 
triangle upright, the Supreme Court should be placed at the apex. 
Precisely because it is the "least dangerous" branch and the branch 
most removed from the transient passions of the day, the Supreme 
Court is in a better position than Congress and the federal executive 
to deliberate calmly and impartially the enduring implications of a 
particular constitutional construction. The Court can more readily 
engage in action that is "genuinely principled, resting with respect 
to every step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and 
reasons quite transc,ending the immediate result that is achieved."66 
These truths argue persuasively for the application of judicial su-
65. See w. CRossKEY, 2 POLITICS AND THE CoNmnJTION IN THE HlsrORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1002-07 (1953), for an argument that the Constitution was intended to 
limit judicial review of congressional acts to those which interfere with judicial opera-
tions. 
66. Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 1001, 1011 (1965). 
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premacy to the co-ordinate branches of the federal government, for 
standing the triangle upright with the Supreme Court at the apex. 
For me, however, they do not ouuveigh the need for preserving intact 
the power of congressional and presidential review, the ability of 
Congress and the federal executive to protect their respective spheres 
of action. I would leave the triangle flat and cease searching for a 
champion among the three branches. 
Why this concern for preserving congressional and presidential 
review? Even if they must operate under judicial supremacy, Con-
gress and the federal executive have a potent array of weapons with 
which to battle the Supreme Court.67 These weapons, however, are 
suited better for extended warfare than for the immediate skirmish. 
They lack efficacy when Congress or the federal executive wishes to 
challenge a constitutional construction in a particular case before 
the Court. More concretely, if the Supreme Court renders a decision 
on the basis of a constitutional construction with which Congress dis-
agrees, it may be precisely that decision which Congress does not 
wish to implement. Although such instances will occur rarely, there 
may be an urgent need for the ability of Congress to reject the 
Court's constitutional construction in the particular case without 
incurring the legal opprobrium of the nation. Under the judicial 
supremacy model, congressional refusal to implement a specific 
Court decision would be an "unconstitutional act," a breach of a 
legal duty imposed by the federal system. 
Potential offshoots from the recent case of Powell v. McCormack6B 
illustrate vividly the need for preserving the right of congressional 
review with respect to a particular case before the Supreme Court. 
In many ways, Powell is a modern day counterpart of Marbury v. 
Madison. As in Marbury, the Court in Powell e.....::ercised the power 
of judicial review in a controversial setting and in a way which 
avoided direct confrontation with the remaining branches of the 
federal government. Through the declaratory judgment device, the 
Powell Court was able to claim new ground for judicial review, 
while at the same time withholding relief which would have invited 
formal congressional repudiation. For example, the Court neatly 
sidestepped Powell's petition for a writ of mandamus ordering the 
Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representative.s to release Powell's 
congressional salary for the t\vo years during which Powell was 
excluded from Congress. Instead, the Court rested content with 
67. See notes 11-13 supra and accompanying text. 
68. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
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its declaratory judgment that the exclusion was unconstitutional.69 
As to the other forms of relief sought by Powell, the Court con-
veniently remanded the case "to the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia with instructions to enter a declaratory 
judgment and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."70 
Thus, Congress was left to fulminate against a phantom holding 
which created no compelling call to arms. 
Suppose, however, that the Supreme Court had ordered the 
House Sergeant-at-Arms to release Powell's back pay. Here the con-
frontation between the Court and Congress would be direct and 
dramatic.71 Under judicial supremacy, Congress would be obligated 
to implement instantly the Court's decision by authorizing the 
Sergeant-at-Arms to pay Powell. Quite possibly, a strong majority of 
Congress would disagree with the Court's construction of the Con-
stitution and would argue that the Court had invaded an area com-
mitted by the Constitution to Congress' sole discretion.72 In this 
setting, should the federal system obligate Congress to implement the 
Court's decision? How far would the Court have to penetrate into 
Congress' internal procedures before the advocates of judicial su-
premacy would say, "Enough!"? If the concept of co-equal branches 
retains any vitality, the federal system should grant to Congress not 
only the raw power, but the legal right to protect its sphere of action. 
We grant readily to Congress the right to resist presidential encroach-
ments in the "particular case"; this right is the tacit premise under-
girding the current debate between Congress and the President over 
our nation's military involvement in Indochina. Why should we be 
less ready to grant to Congress a parallel right to resist judicial en-
croachments? The potential ramifications of Powell show that the 
need for congressional review can be equally as urgent in the one 
case as in the other. 
To solve the problem created by Powell, the right of Congress 
and the President to reject a Supreme Court constitutional construe-
69. 395 U.S. at 550. 
70. 395 U.S. at 550. 
71. Concerning the likelihood of a clash between the Court and Congress, the 
Powell Court commented "the Court has noted that it is an 'inadmissible suggestion' 
that action might be taken in disregard of a judicial determination. McPherson v. 
Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 24 (1892)." 395 U.S. at 549 n.86. 
72. See the revealing series of letters from counsel for plaintiff and defendant to the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia upon remand of Powell, 
debating the propriety of suggesting to the court that the House of Representatives 
might well disobey any affirmative order directed to its agents. The letters are set forth 
in McKay, Comments on Powell v. McCormack, 17 UCLA L. REv. 117, 126-29 nn.42-44 
(1969). 
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tion could be limited to Court constructions which interfere with 
the procedural machinery of Congress or the federal executive. This 
"internal procedure" model of viable tension would leave unscathed 
most of the Court's constructions and would enhance predictab_ility 
·within the federal system. It would fail, however, to provide legal 
protection against constructions by the Court which, while not af-
fecting the internal procedure of the legislative or the executive 
branches, might cause great damage to the nation. For example, 
Plessy v. Ferguson73 gave legal sanction to segregated public facilities 
and did much to foster a belief in the morality of racial segregation 
throughout the nation, and particularly in the South. We are still 
paying the price of this legacy today. 
The Powell case is just one example of a policy consideration 
which permeates the federal system: preserving generous opportunity 
for political endeavor.74 For reasons already discussed, the federal 
system should offer an ample array of legitimate means for seeking 
orderly change. And the need for orderly change may relate, albeit 
infrequently, to modification or rejection of a Supreme Court con-
stitutional construction in the particular case before the Court. 
Here, judicial supremacy would provide no legitimate means for 
seeking relief. Acquiescence or illegal assertion of power would be 
the only available options. Conversely, viable tension, if applied to 
Congress and the federal executive, would make those two branches 
unencumbered vehicles for political endeavor designed to block im-
plementation of a specific Court decision. Precisely at the time of 
need, Congress and the federal executive would then serve as federal 
system safety valves for legitimate action against Supreme Court fool-
ishness or usurpation. 
Viable tension is not a novel concept. Respected Presidents have 
argued for some degree of viable tension among the three branches 
of the federal government. In the statements and writings of J effer-
son,75 Jackson,76 Lincoln,77 and Franklin Roosevelt,78 there is at least 
73. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
74. Writing prior to the Warren Court era, Henry Steele Commager expressed 
strong hostility to judicial review as a "drag upon democracy" and concluded tliat 
"Congress, and not the courts, emerges as the instrument for the realization of the 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights." Commager, Judicial Review and Democracy, in 
JUDICIAL REvIEW AND THE SUPREME COURT 64, 73 (L. Levy ed. 1967). For a more recent 
and more favorable approach toward judicial review, see Rostow, The Democratic 
Character of Judicial Review, in JUDICIAL REvlEW AND THE SUPREME COURT 74 (L. Levy 
ed. 1967). 
75 ••.• You seem to think it devolved on the judges to decide on the validity 
of the sedition law. But nothing in the Constitution has given them a right to de• 
cide for the Executive, more than to the Executive to decide for them. Both magis• 
tracies are equally independent in the sphere of action assigned to them. The 
judges, believing the law constitutional, had a right to pass a sentence of fine and 
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imprisonment; because that power was placed in their hands by the Constitution. 
But the Executive, believing the law to be unconstitutional, was bound to remit 
the c.,;:ecution of it; because that power has been confided to him by the Constitu-
tion. That instrument meant that its co-ordinate branches should be checks on 
each other. But the opinion which gives to the judges the right to decide what laws 
are constitutional, and what not, not only for themselves in their own sphere of 
action, but for the Legislature &: Executive also, in their spheres, would make the 
judiciary a despotic branch. 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams, Sept. ll, 1804, in 8 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 3ll (P. Ford ed. 1897). See also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to 
Judge Spencer Roane, Sept. 6, 1819, and Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William C. 
Jarvis, Sept. 28, 1820, in IO THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 140-41, 160-61 (P. Ford 
ed. 1899). Clearly, Jefferson is here claiming that Congress and the federal executive can 
legally reject a Supreme Court constitutional construction in the particular case before 
the Court, as well as in future fact situations raising the same legal issue. 
76 •••• It is maintained by the advocates of the bank that its constitutionality 
in all its features ought to be considered as settled by precedent and by the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court. To this conclusion I can not assent • . . . . 
• • • The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided 
by its own opinion of the Constitution. • • . It is as much the duty of the House 
of Representatives, of the Senate, and of the President to decide upon the consti-
tutionality of any bill or resolution which may be presented to them for passage-
or approval as it is of the supreme judges when it may be brought before them for 
judicial decision. The opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress 
than the opinion of Congress has over the judges, and on that point the President 
is independent of both. The authority of the Supreme Court must not, therefore, 
be permitted to control the Congress or the Executive when acting in their legis-
lative capacities, but to have only such influence as the force of their reasoning 
may deserve. 
Message of Andrew Jackson vetoing the bill to recharter the Bank of the United States, 
July 10, 1832, 2 MESSAGES AND PAFERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 576, 581-82 CT• Richardson ed. 
1897). Jackson plainly states that Congress and the federal executive can legally reject 
a Supreme Court constitutional construction in future fact situations raising the same 
legal issue. His language also supports a right of rejection in the particular case before 
the Court. Any doubt on this latter point should be resolved by his failure to enforce 
the Court's mandate in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). See text ac-
companying notes 53-58 supra. 
77. In a speech delivered during the Lincoln-Douglas senatorial campaign of 1858, 
Lincoln commented in regard to Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857): 
••• We do not propose that when Dred Scott has been decided to be a slave by 
the court, we as a mob will decide him to be free • • • . [B]ut we nevertheless do 
oppose that decision as a political rule which shall be binding on the voter, to 
vote for nobody who thinks it wrong, which shall be binding on the members of 
Congress or the President to favor no measure that does not actually concur with 
the principles of that decision. We do not propose to be bound by it as a political 
rule in that way, because we think it lays the foundation not merely of enlarging 
and spreading out what we consider an evil, but it lays the foundation for spreading 
that evil into the States themselves. We propose so resisting it as to have it re-
versed if we can, and a new judicial rule established upon this subject ..•• 
Sixth Debate between Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Douglas, Quincy, Ill., Oct. 
13, 1858, in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 245, 255 (R. Basler ed. 1953). 
I do not forget the position assumed by some that constitutional questions are to 
be decided by the Supreme Court, nor do I deny that such decisions must be bind-
ing in any case upon the J;>arties to a suit as to the object of that suit, while they 
are also entitled to very high respect and consideration in all parallel cases by all 
other departments of the Government •••• [I]f the policy of the Government upon 
vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions 
of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litigation between 
parties in personal actions the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, 
having to that extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of that 
eminent tribunal. 
First Inaugural Address of Abraham Lincoln, March 4, 1861, 7 MEssAGES AND PAFERS OF 
1306 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 70:1279 
this common denominator of agreement: In relation to a Supreme 
Court constitutional construction, Congress and the federal execu-
tive should have a viable tension right to reject the Court's construc-
tion in future fact situations raising the same legal issue; that is, the 
right to exert continuing pressure on the Court by generating a series 
of cases testing the Court's willingness to persist in its construction. 
In the Lincoln-Douglas debates, Lincoln expressed this view suc-
cinctly in relation to the Dred Scott decision: "If I were in Congress, 
and a vote should come up on a question whether slavery should be 
prohibited in a new territory, in spite of that Dred Scott decision, I 
would vote that it should."79 Here, Lincoln is saying plainly that 
Congress and the federal executive are not obligated to conform their 
future conduct to a Supreme Court construction of the Constitution. 
They are not obligated, again in Lincoln's words, to adopt the 
Court's construction as "a rule of political action for the people and 
all the departments of the government."80 On this issue, Jefferson, 
Jackson, and Roosevelt agreed clearly with Lincoln.81 
Concerning rejection of a Supreme Court constitutional construc-
tion in the particular case before the Court, the four Presidents are 
THE PRESIDENTS 3210-11 CT, Richardson ed. 1897). See also Addresses of Abraham Lin-
coln, July 10, 1858, Chicago, Ill., July 17, 1858, Springfield, Ill., in 2 THE CoLLEcn:n 
WORKS OF ABRAHAM l.INCOLN 484, 494-95, 504, 516 (R. Basler ed. 1953). 
78. The following is an excerpt from a draft of a speech which President Roosevelt 
planned to deliver had the Supreme Court decided against the Government on the 
constitutionality of abrogating "gold clauses" in federal obligations. In fact, in a li•to-4 
decision, the Court upheld the Government's position in Perry v. United States, 294 
U.S. 330 (1935). 
It is the duty of the Congress and the President to protect the people of the United 
States to the best of their ability, It is necessary to protect them from the unin• 
tended construction of voluntary acts, as wcll as from intolerable burdens involun-
tarily imposed. To stand idly by and to permit the decision of the Supreme Court 
to be carried through to its logical, inescapable conclusion would so imperil the 
economic and political security of this nation that the legislative and executive 
officers of the Government must look beyond the narrow letter of contractual obli-
gations, so that they may sustain the substance of the promise originally made in 
accord with the actual intention of the parties, 
••• I shall immediately take such steps as may be necessary, by proclamation and 
by message to the Congress of the United States, 
3 F.D.R.: His PERSONAL l.ETTERs, 1928-1945, 456, 459-60 (E. Roosevelt ed. 1950). Although 
the precise import of these remarks is unclear, Roosevelt seemingly is here asserting a 
legal right to block the continuing effect of the Court's decision in the particular case 
before the Court. Beyond cavil, he is asserting with Jefferson, Jackson, and Lincoln a 
legal right to reject the Court's decision in future fact situations raising the same legal 
issue. In this same draft, Roosevelt quoted with approval from the portion of Lincoln's 
First Inaugural Address reproduced in note 77 supra. 
79. Address of Abraham Lincoln, Chicago, Ill., July 10, 1858, 2 THE CoLLECTED 
WoRKS OF A.BRAHAM LINCOLN 484, 494-95 (R. Basler ed. 1953). 
80. Address of Abraham Lincoln, Springfield, Ill., July 17, 1858, 2 THE COL• 
LECTED WORKS OF A.BRAHAM LINCOLN 504, 516 (R. Basler ed. 1953). 
81. See notes 75, 76 &: 78 supra. 
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not in agreement. In his First Inaugural Address, Lincoln conceded 
that in this instance the Court's construction should be implemented: 
And while it is obviously possible that such decision may be errone-
ous in any given case, still the evil effect following it, being limited 
to that particular case, with the chance that it may be overruled and 
never become a precedent for other cases, can better be borne than 
could the evils of a different practice.82 
In contrast, Jefferson, Jackson, and Roosevelt, with varying degrees 
of clarity, seem to argue for a right in Congress and the federal execu-
tive to reject the Court's construction even in the particular case 
before the Court.83 The tenor of the presidential remarks, especially 
Roosevelt's,84 suggests that the right should be exercised sparingly 
and only in instances of great need, but for purposes of this analysis, 
the crucial fact is the apparent recognition of the right. 
More generally, all four Presidents were concerned with pre-
serving within the federal system generous opportunity for political 
endeavor, and with preserving Congress and the federal executive 
as legitimate avenues for political action designed to blunt the con-
tinuing effect of a Supreme Court constitutional construction. While 
articulating their concern primarily in relation to future fact situa-
tions raising the same legal issue, the four Presidents also stressed the 
more generic need for protecting congressional and presidential 
prerogatives against judicial encroachments. And with respect to the 
particular case before the Court, only the viable tension model af • 
fords this needed protection. Here, more than anytvhere else in the 
federal system, opportunity for political endeavor becomes a com-
pelling policy consideration. 
Would chaos result from application of viable tension to the co-
ordinate branches of the federal government? As stressed earlier, the 
82. First Inaugural Address of Abraham Lincoln, March 4, 1861, 7 MESSAGES AND 
PAPERS OF nm PRESIDENTS 3210-11 a. Richardson ed. 1897). Fairly construed, this state-
ment suggests that Lincoln would regard the entire federal system as obligated to com-
ply with a Supreme Court constitutional construction in the particular case before the 
Court. Earlier in the Address (see note 77 supra) Lincoln does refer to the Court's 
decision as "binding in any case upon the parties to a suit as to the object of that 
suit." Technically, this leaves open the question of the decision's binding effect 
on governmental departments which are not parties to the litigation. 
83. See notes 75, 76 & 78 supra. 
84. Viewed as the assertion of a legal right to block the Court in the particular case, 
the draft of Roosevelt's speech concerning the "gold clause" cases (see note 78 supra) 
vividly illustrates the type of Supreme Court construction that can have a dramatic 
impact on the nation. Roosevelt clearly believed that an adverse Court holding would 
have created a national economic crisis. In this conte.xt, should the federal system leave 
the President only the options of acquiescence or illegal assertion of power? In such an 
instance the viable tension model provides a legal safety-valve for the federal system, 
a means of enabling the President to generate legally a countervailing political pres-
sure against the Court's constitutional construction in the particular case. 
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viable tension model requires a disagreement on constitutional con-
struction.85 Specifically, Congress and the federal e.'Cecutive can reject 
implementation of a Supreme Court decision only when they dis-
agree with the constitutional construction upon which the decision 
is based. Mere belief that the decision is unwise, ill-timed, or based 
on erroneous statutory construction will not trigger the viable ten-
sion right of rejection. Thus restricted, how often would this right 
of rejection be asserted? Recent history is instructive. From 1953 to 
1969, the Warren Court issued a wide range of decisions affecting 
fundamentally the political and social patterns of the nation.80 Many 
of these decisions were highly controversial. If ever a period was ripe 
for congressional or presidential repudiation of the Court, this 
would seem to have been that period. And yet, with one arguable ex-
ception, 87 the record is barren of any congressional or presidential 
action formally repudiating a Warren Court constitutional construc-
tion. Grumblings and verbal protests abounded, occasionally coalesc-
ing into abortive attempts at formal repudiation or modification.88 
85. See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra. 
86. Among these decisions were Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (e.xpanding 
the rights of the accused subjected to "custodial interrogation" in a criminal proceed• 
ing); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (requiring that both houses of a state legis-
lature be apportioned on a population basis); School Dist. of Abington Township v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (prohibiting state-prescribed prayer reading in the public 
schools); and Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (prohibiting state-supported 
racial segregation in the public schools). 
87. Arguably, Title II of the Crime Control Act of 1968, particularly 18 U.S.C, 
§ 350l(b) (1970), constitutes a congressional and presidential repudiation of the Court's 
constitutional construction in Miranda. Even here, however, the federal executive pur-
ported to be acting in compliance with existing law and did not formally reject the 
Miranda holding. On signing the Crime Control Act into law on June 19, 1968, Presi-
dent Johnson commented that "the provisions of Title II, vague and ambiguous as 
they are, can, I am advised by the Attorney General, be interpreted in harmony with 
the Constitution." N.Y. Times, June 20, 1968, at 23, col. 5. 
88. See McKay, Court, Congress and Reapportionment, 63 MICH, L. R.Ev. 255 (1964), 
for a discussion of unsuccessful congressional efforts to curtail federal court jurisdic-
tion in legislative apportionment cases. These efforts were a reaction to the Supreme 
Court's decisions in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186 (1962). See W. Beaney and E. Beiser, Prayer and Politics: TIie Impact of Engel and 
Schempp on the Political Process, in THE lMPAcr OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 20 
(T. Becker ed. 1969), for a similar discussion of unsuccessful congressional efforts to 
blunt the Court's school prayer decisions in School Dist. of Abington Township v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). For still more 
recent developments on the prayer issue, see 117 CONG. REc. H. 10590-658 (daily ed. Nov. 
8, 1971) reporting the defeat by the House of Representatives of H.R.J. Res, 191, 92d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), a proposed constitutional amendment which would authorize 
"voluntary prayer or meditation" in "any public building which is supported in whole 
or in part through expenditure of public funds." The proposed amendment failed by 
twenty-eight votes to obtain the two-thirds majority required for passage of the amend-
ment. Arguably, this amendment attempt represents a congressional repudiation of vi-
able tension in that Congress has here recoguized that only a constitutional amendment 
can overcome the Court's prayer decisions. However, it is possible that Congress chose 
the amendment route because it was not ready to create the stronger friction that would 
result from a formal repudiation of the Court by a simple majority vote, 
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But, no official challenge ever emerged. This history of restraint sug-
gests that Congress and the federal executive would exercise respon-
sibly a viable tension right of rejection; at this level, viable tension 
would not invite caprice.89 
Judicial supremacy advocates would argue that "this history of 
restraint" stems largely from the belief of Congress and the federal 
executive that they are obligated legally to comply with the Court's 
constitutional constructions, that this is an area where a nation's 
conception of oughtness, as nurtured by the experience of history, 
has made a difference. Indeed, the increased political endeavor con-
templated under the viable tension model may undercut reliance 
upon the past history of restraint. I cannot refute this argument 
completely. I can suggest that two other factors have contributed to 
the restraint: First, even under viable tension, a Supreme Court 
constitutional construction would, in Lincoln's phrase, be "entitled 
to very high respect and consideration"90 among Congress and the 
federal executive. Desire to avoid the friction resulting from a clash 
among the branches of the federal government would operate as a 
check against casual rejection of the Court. Second, in the Warren 
Court era under discussion, Congress and the federal executive, on 
the whole, have probably agreed with the Court's major constitu-
tional innovations. And, under viable tension, such would generally 
be the case. Congress and the federal executive would follow the 
Court, not only to shun the risk of conflict, but more often because 
the Court's constitutional construction would commend itself to 
reason and would be regarded as "right" on the merits. It takes a 
Powell case to push Congress to the brink; and if a Powell case does 
occur, congressional resentment at "judicial encroachment" is apt to 
ovenvhelm whatever presumption of oughtness the Court's construc-
tion may carry. 
Reviewing this subsection, the policy factor of opportunity for 
political endeavor points strongly toward adoption of viable tension 
among the three branches of the federal government. With roughly 
equal strength, the policy factor of predictability points toward 
judicial supremacy. Standing in the middle, the wording of the 
Constitution is a neutral policy factor, discernibly favoring neither 
89. This election year has produced intense pressure in Congress for "anti-busing" 
legislation. In light of this pressure, the congressional response to the busing issue in 
the Education Amendments of 1972 can be characterized as remarkably mild. See 
N.Y. Times, June 9, 1972, at 21, cols.1-8, for a summary of the busing provisions adopted 
by Congress. This restrained reaction by Congress can be cited as further evidence that 
application of the viable tension model to the other federal branches would not lead 
to the "constitutional construction by public poll" that some fear. 
90. See note 77 supra. 
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model. Judged alone by these three factors, the policy arguments for 
the competing models are in approximate balance. Thus, the deci-
sive factor favoring viable tension becomes the relationship between 
obligation and power. As before noted, if applied to Congress and 
the federal executive, judicial supremacy could create situations in 
\vhich the definition of legal obligation diverges widely from the 
realities of power.91 Unless the cumulative impact of other policy 
factors strongly favors judicial supremacy, there is no compelling 
reason to risk this wide divergence. Accordingly, I would apply the 
viable tension model to Congress and the federal executive. At this 
level, viable tension harmonizes power and obligation by recognizing 
that Supreme Court decisions depend for their efficacy upon con-
gressional and presidential support. History shows that a President 
Jackson can challenge successfully a Chief Justice Marshall;02 ap• 
plied to Congress and the federal executive, viable tension but re-
flects the experience of history. 
If Congress or the federal executive disagrees with a Supreme 
Court constitutional construction, the viable tension model should 
require that disagreement to be stated expressly. Although this re-
quirement is mechanical only, it would bring home more forcibly 
to the dissenting branch the serious nature of its action. Moreover, it 
would protect against ambiguous congressional or presidential re-
action to a Supreme Court decision; if viable tension is to be trig-
gered, it would at least be triggered openly and forthrightly. Absent 
an express rejection of the Court's constitutional construction, Con-
gress and the federal executive should regard themselves as obligated 
to comply with the Court's decision. Thus, each Court decision 
would carry a rebuttable presumption of oughtness, placing upon 
Congress and the federal executive the burden of formulating an 
express repudiation. While not depriving viable tension of its sting, 
such a burden would make the model more acceptable. 
91. See text accompanying notes 53-58 supra. Perhaps in recognition of this fact, 
the Supreme Court, in Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867), held that 
it lacked the power to enjoin directly either the President or Congress. Emphasizing 
enforcement problems, the Court stated that if the President disobeyed an injunction, 
••• it is needless to observe that the court is without power to enforce its process. 
If, on the other hand, the President complies with the order of the court and re-
fuses to execute the acts of Congress, is it not clear that a collision may occur be• 
tween the Executive and Legislative Departments of the Government ••• ? May 
not the House of Representatives impeach the President for such refusal? And in 
that case could this court interfere, in behalf of the President? 
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 500-01. By way of contrast, the Court has held that it has the 
power to issue a writ of mandamus against lesser executive officials to compel the per-
formance of ministerial acts. Kendall v. United States on the Relation of Stokes, 37 
U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838). 
92. See text accompanying notes 53-58 supra. 
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Professor Wechsler has suggested an alternative approach for de-
termining the binding effect of a Supreme Court decision. In The 
Courts and the Constitution,93 Wechsler quotes the passage from 
Lincoln's First Inaugural Address94 analyzing the Supreme Court's 
role in the federal system. Regarding Lincoln's analysis, Wechsler 
comments: 
A doctrine that is valid for the President and Congress surely must 
be valid also for the State and its officials. But note the purpose of the 
limitation stated: to allow for the "chance" that the decision "may 
be overruled and never become a precedent for other cases." When 
that chance has been exploited and has run its course, with reaffirma-
tion rather than reversal of decision, has not the time arrived when 
its acceptance is demanded, ·without insisting on repeated litiga-
tion?95 
Wechsler's approach contemplates a second swing at bat for any 
governmental branch which disagrees with a Supreme Court consti-
tutional construction. If, however, the Court reaffirms its prior con-
struction, this apparently ends the matter. Among the three branches 
of the federal government, Wechsler's model of "secondary judicial 
supremacy" blunts the potency of congressional and presidential 
review. It merely postpones by one step the point in time at which 
Congress and the federal executive are required to accept the Court's 
construction of the Constitution. It disables Congress and the federal 
executive from providing the federal system with adequate protection 
against Supreme Court blunders in the particular case before the 
Court. More fundamentally, the Wechsler model fails to discriminate 
among the various parts of the federal system. While favoring the 
Supreme Court too strongly in relation to Congress and the federal 
executive, it favors the states too strongly in relation to the Supreme 
Court. The legislative and executive branches of the state govern-
ments, as well as the state judiciaries, require a more vigorous form 
of judicial supremacy than that offered by the Wechsler model. Here, 
secondary judicial supremacy would weave too thin a veil of ought-
ness. 
The final problem of this subsection concerns conflict resolution 
among the three branches of the federal government. Even if limited 
to Congress and the federal executive, viable tension would still 
create for the federal system a potential oughtness limbo. This con-
sequence is unavoidable once we grant to Congress and the federal 
93. 65 CoLUM, L, REv. 1001 (1965). 
94. See note 77 supra. 
95. 65 COLU!lf. L. R.Ev. at 1008. 
1312 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 70: 1270 
executive a viable tension right to reject a Supreme Court constitu-
tional construction. While theoretically the period of limbo could 
continue indefinitely, as a practical matter the federal system would 
not tolerate such an indefinite state. Assuming a conflict between 
the Congress and the Court on a question of constitutional construc-
tion, the conflict would, in the course of time, work itself out through 
the political process. Congress and the Court would each have avail-
able for combat the same array of weapons as under the judicial su-
premacy model. The crucial distinction between the competing 
models is in the conception of oughtness which would prevail while 
the combat continues. Until resolution of the conflict, Congress, 
under judicial supremacy, would be acting illegally each time it 
rejected the Court's constitutional construction; under viable ten-
sion, the congressional rejections would be legal. Under either 
model, the conflict would move eventually to resolution. Thus, 
neither model immunizes the federal system against political con-
flict among the three branches of the federal government. Judicial 
supremacy would label the non-Court contestant a ·wrongdoer;00 
reflecting more closely the realities of power, viable tension would 
remove the label. 
Instead of Congress, assume that the President is in conflict with 
the Court. Because of the Court's dependence on the federal execu-
tive for the enforcement of its orders, the initial advantage in this 
conflict would almost certainly lie with the President. Against the 
President's control of the federal government's enforcement ma-
chinery, the Court's weapon of moral suasion would, at the outset, 
have little practical effect. If, however, Congress, supported strongly 
by public opinion, entered the arena on the side of the Court, the 
realities of political power would probably shift to the Court's ad-
vantage. Absent megalomania, no President would be likely to per-
sist, for any extended period of time, in a position that arouses the 
intense hostility of the Court, Congress, and the general public. Via-
ble tension would not lead inevitably to presidential supremacy. 
In conflict resolution among the federal branches, the preceding 
96. On the propriety of labeling Congress a wrongdoer in this situation, a quote 
from Justice Holmes is apt: " ••• it must be remembered that legislators arc the ulti-
mate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree 
as the courts." Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904). 
Concerning the responsibility of Congress to determine independently the constitu-
tionality of legislation before its enactment, see Hearings on S. 1732 (the public accom-
modations section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-b (1970)) 
Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 431-ll2 (1963) 
(colloquy between Senator Warren G. Magnuson, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Comm. 
on Commerce and James J. Kilpatrick, former editor of the Richmond News-Leader), 
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paragraph suggests that any one branch would normally have a 
difficult time prevailing over the united opposition of the remain-
ing two branches. If this is so, why not construct a model that re-
flects this reality, a model of "prevailing-majority viable tension"? 
Under this model, if two branches of the federal government agree 
expressly on a question of constitutional construction, the third 
branch would be legally obligated to accept that construction. Be-
cause it attempts to match obligation closely to power, such a model 
has some pragmatic appeal. But lacking the historical support that 
viable tension can claim, 97 such a principle appears somewhat artifi-
cial and contrived. Rather than constituting a separate model for 
defining the binding effect of a Supreme Court constitutional con-
struction, the prevailing-majority analysis seems more accurately to 
constitute a description of how conflict among the federal branches 
would generally be resolved. I would recur to viable tension in its 
purer form as the more appropriate model for defining the legal 
obligation of Congress and the federal executive to comply with a 
Supreme Court constitutional construction. 
D. The Legislative and Executive Branches 
of the State Governments 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the Su-
preme Law of the Land; ... os 
Sweeping broadly, this subsection includes within "the legisla-
tive and executive branches of the state governments" all legislative 
and executive branches functioning within political subdivisions 
created under state authority. More technically, this subsection com-
prehends any legislative and executive action which constitutes "state 
action"99 within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. For ease 
of discussion throughout this subsection, the phrase "legislative and 
executive branches of the state governments" will be compressed to 
"state governments." Any state action primarily judicial in nature 
97. See notes 75-84 supra and accompanying text. 
98. U.S. CoNST., art. VI. 
99. The unfolding saga of the state action concept is beyond the scope of this article. 
The literature on the subject is voluminous. See Henkin, Shelley v. Kramer: Notes for a 
Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 473 (1962); Horowitz, The Misleading Search for 
"State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 CAI.IF. L. R.Ev. 208 (1957); Lewis, 
The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLtJM. L. R.Ev. 1083 (1960); Van Alstyne & Karst, 
State Action, 14 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1961); Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 
TEXAS L. R.Ev. 347 (1963); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. 
R.Ev. 1065, 1069-72 (1969). 
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would be covered by the earlier analysis of state courts100 and is not 
considered here. 
I would apply to the state governments a slightly modified form 
of judicial supremacy. With one exception, state governments should 
be obligated to comply instantly with a Supreme Court constitu-
tional construction, both in the particular case before the Court 
and in all future fact situations raising the same legal issue. The one 
exception is tied to action by Congress or the federal executive. If 
either Congress or the federal executive expressly rejects the Court's 
constitutional construction, the state governments, at their discre-
tion, would be free to do likewise. However, absent an express re-
jection by Congress or the federal executive, the state governments 
would be obligated to follow the Court's construction until changed 
by the Court itself or by constitutional amendment. Phrased prac-
tically, state governments can escape judicial supremacy only through 
the action of Congress or the federal executive. 
Why concede this escape hatch to state governments? The con-
cession flows irresistibly from the application of viable tension to 
Congress and the federal executive. As long as the three branches of 
the federal government agree on a question of constitutional con-
struction, federal supremacy dictates state government compliance. 
When the federal government speaks as a unit, state governments 
cannot feign ignorance of the federal government's command. When, 
however, the federal government does not speak as a unit, the state 
governments may ask legitimately, "Which branch of the federal 
government should we obey?" Concretely, if Congress expressly re-
jects a Supreme Court constitutional construction, Congress, as much 
as the Court, represents the federal government to the states. Here, 
the federal government's trumpet bears an uncertain sound. As long 
as the contest continues between Congress and the Court, the state 
governments should be free to choose their champion in the lists. 
They should be free to influence the contest through support of the 
constitutional construction they deem correct. Once the contest is 
resolved at the federal government level, the prevailing constitu-
tional construction would again become binding upon the state 
governments. And, as in the contest just resolved, only a subsequent 
rejection by Congress or the federal executive could spark a new 
contest with the Court. 
In applying modified judicial supremacy to state governments, 
the school prayer issue is the paradigm. In School District of Abing-
ton Township v. Schempp,101 the Supreme Court held that a state 
100. See text accompanying notes 44-52 supra. 
101. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
June 1972] Judicial Supremacy Re-examined 1315 
cannot require prayer reading in the public schools. Modified judi-
cial supremacy would make the Court's constitutional construction 
instantly binding on all public school districts in the land. More 
broadly, all state governments would be obligated immediately to 
conform their future conduct to the Schempp requirements. The 
obligation imposed on state governments and the school districts 
operating under their authority would extend, not only to the formal 
parties in Schempp, but to all fact situations fairly covered by the 
Schempp holding. Only an express rejection of Schempp by Con-
gress or the federal executive would release state governments and 
their school districts from the obligation defined in this paragraph. 
Until such a rejection occurred, the Court's constitutional construc-
tion in Schempp would be truly the supreme law of the land for state 
governments. In actuality, neither Congress nor the federal executive 
has rejected Schempp, a highly controversial decision.102 This fact 
illustrates that modified judicial supremacy has a practical potency 
for state governments which will be affected only rarely by the 
congressional or presidential escape hatch.103 
The wording of the Constitution strongly supports the applica-
tion of modified judicial supremacy to the state governments. The 
supremacy clause connotes federal government supremacy over state 
governments in the areas of authority delegated to the federal govern-
ment under the Constitution. This was the interpretation given to 
the clause in McCulloch v. Maryland,104 and history has made this 
interpretation an integral part of the federal system.105 Although 
McCulloch involved state government defiance of a congressional 
act, the application of federal supremacy should not be limited to 
acts initiated by Congress. It should apply with equal force to acts 
initiated by the federal executive or the Supreme Court. So viewed, 
federal supremacy does not depend upon which branch of the federal 
government initiates the act in question; rather, it depends upon the 
unity of the federal government in relation to the act.106 As long as 
the federal government speaks as a unit in support of the act, federal 
102. See Heaney and Beiser, supra note 88. 
103. See text accompanying notes 86-89 supra. 
104. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 424 (1819). 
105. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (upholding the extension of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act to employees of state schools and hospitals); United States 
v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1961) (upholding against the conflicting provisions of Oregon 
probate law a federal statute regulating, under specified circumstances, the distribution 
at death of a veteran's personal property). 
106. The discussion of this paragraph assumes always that the federal government, 
in the opinion of all three of its branches, is acting in an area of authority delegated 
to it under the Constitution. Obviously, under the viable tension model, this assump• 
tion itself could be the object of disagreement among the three branches. 
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supremacy should preclude state government repudiation of the act. 
Moreover, the continuing presumption should be in favor of federal 
government unity in the absence of express disagreement among its 
three branches. Specifically, a Supreme Court constitutional con-
struction occurs often without prior action by Congress or the 
federal executive;107 in other instances, such prior action galvanizes 
the Court response.108 In either event, the Court's construction is an 
act by one branch of the federal government. Until repudiated ex-
pressly by Congress or the federal executive, this act of construction 
should carry an immediate and continuing presumption of validity 
as against the state governments. The constitutional mandate . of 
federal supremacy requires nothing less. 
Equally with the wording of the Constitution, predictability be-
comes a second policy factor strongly supporting the application of 
modified judicial supremacy to the state governments. Consider 
again the second sentence of Justice Holmes' statement concerning 
judicial review: "I do think that the Union would be imperiled if 
we could not make that declaration [ of unconstitutionality] as to the 
laws of the several states."109 As noted earlier, this statement recog-
nizes, on the issue of judicial review, a hierarchy of urgency among 
the several parts of the federal system. On the related issue of a 
Supreme Court decision's binding effect, the hierarchy of urgency 
is even more dramatic. It is one thing to grant Congress and the 
federal executive a viable tension right to reject a Supreme Court 
constitutional construction. Here, the right is confined narrowly, 
and history indicates that it may be rarely asserted. It is a dras-
tically different thing to grant this same right of rejection to fifty 
state governments and their multitudinous political subdivisions. 
Here, history evidences amply that state governments would exer-
cise their right of rejection frequently, sometimes defiantly, and 
often with little concern for the national interest.110 On many issues 
107. Typical of this situation are cases in which the Court reviews the constitution• 
ality of prior state action. E.g., School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 
U.S. 203 (1963) (review of a state statute requiring the reading in public schools of a 
state-prescribed prayer); and Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (review 
of state statutes requiring or authorizing racial segregation in public schools). 
108. Typical of this situation are cases in which the Court reviews the constitu-
tionality of prior congressional or presidential action. E.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 
U.S. 486 (1969) (review of Adam Clayton Powell's e.xclusion from membership in the 
House of Representatives). 
109. 0. Hou.ms, supra note 64, at 296. 
110. For instance, Governor Wallace's resistance of a court desegregation order by 
standing in the gateway of a public school is brought to mind. See N.Y. Times, June 
12, 1963, at 1, col. 8. More broadly, one can readily predict the result of according to 
public school districts a viable tension right to reject the Supreme Court's constitu-
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of constitutional construction, regional defiance of the Court would 
become the prevailing norm. The resulting constitutional fratricide 
would make a shambles of the federal system. Wearing different 
garb, the discredited doctrine of interposition would win a belated 
victory.111 
Even more fundamentally, pure viable tension ignores the per-
son affected adversely by state government defiance of the Supreme 
Court. Here, the urgency of predictability is acute. If, at their own 
volition, state governments can legally reject Court decisions, persons 
affected by these decisions must operate in a maze of uncertainty. 
The constitutional rights secured by these decisions would exist at 
state government sufferance. Nor is it sufficient to say that state gov-
ernments must accept the Court's constitutional construction only 
in the particular case before the Court. This meets only partially the 
needs of predictability. While it is true technically that a court de-
cision binds only the parties before the court,112 as applied to state 
governments the federal system requires a more generous conception 
of judicial power. To give a Supreme Court constitutional construc-
tion its proper scope, it must be held to bind instantly the state gov-
ernments in all fact situations to which the construction is fairly 
applicable. Even with its scope thus extended, the construction will 
often require piecemeal litigation for its effective implementation. 
But, to restrict the construction's binding effect to the particular 
case before the Court is to invest state delay tactics with the aura of 
legality. The school prayer and school desegregation decisions illus-
trate the difficulty of implementing a Supreme Court constitutional 
construction against a recalcitrant state government. At the very 
least, the federal system should saddle that recalcitrance with the 
burden of legal opprobrium. In this context, the Court's construc-
tion, not the state government's dissent, should reap the benefits 
of oughtness. 
tional constructions in Brown and Schempp. See Blaustein and Ferguson, Avoidance, 
Evasion and Delay, Birkby, The Supreme Court and the Bible Belt: Tennessee Reaction 
to the "Schempp" Decision, Johnson, Compliance and Supreme Court Decision Making, 
in THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (T. Becker ed. 1969). 
111. Under this doctrine, state governments, at various points in history, have as-
serted the right to "interpose" their own construction of the Constitution against fed-
eral action. In Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 364 U.S. 500 (1960), the Supreme 
Court bluntly rejected the doctrine, observing that "'interposition is not a constitu-
tional doctrine. If taken seriously, it is illegal defiance of constitutional authority.'" 
364 U.S. at 501, quoting from the three-judge federal district court opinion in Bush, 
188 F. Supp. 916, 926 (E.D. La. 1960). See also Reference Note, Interposition vs. Judicial 
Power-A Study of Ultimate Authority in Constitutional Questions, I Race Rel. L. 
Rep. 465 (1956). 
112. See note 24 supra. 
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The abstractions of the preceding paragraph need concrete illus-
tration. Turning again to the school prayer issue, why should the 
Schempp constitutional construction instantly bind all school dis-
tricts in the land? Why not limit the decision's binding effect to the 
parties before the Court? It is a central thesis of this Article that a 
nation's conception of oughtness does make a difference. If school 
districts regard themselves as obligated to comply instantly with 
Schempp, they will be more likely to comply promptly, without 
awaiting legal compulsion. Conversely, if school districts regard their 
legal obligation as beginning only with their specific inclusion in a 
court order, they will be more likely to delay compliance until that 
court order arrives. The same phenomenon operates at a school dis-
trict's community level. The community's conception of oughtness 
will influence the degree of compliance-pressure which the commu-
nity is willing to exert on the school district officials. Thus, to limit 
the binding effect of Schempp to the parties before the Court gives 
legal sanction to inertia; it forces inexorably a resort to piecemeal 
litigation as the only means of extending the legal effect of the holding 
to nonparty school districts. To place a mantle of oughtness on this 
tedious process largely deprives the Court's constitutional construc-
tion of any immediate efficacy. In practical terms, it authorizes a 
school district to say to the federal government, "Catch me, if you 
can." Here, the federal system's conception of oughtness "should be 
made of sterner stuff."113 
Applied to state governments, modified judicial supremacy would 
diminish opportunity for political endeavor. Although serious, this 
disadvantage loses urgency through application of viable tension to 
the co-ordinate branches of the federal government. If Congress and 
the federal executive are each conceded a viable tension right to re-
ject a Supreme Court constitutional construction, this concession 
provides an ample safety valve for political pressure within the fed-
eral system. There is no need to gild the lily by granting a similar 
right to state governments. In effect, because it can flourish else-
where in the federal system, opportunity for political endeavor be-
comes a policy factor supporting viable tension only modestly at the 
state government level. 
Nor would modified judicial supremacy divorce obligation from 
power. A state government's obligation to follow the Court would 
continue until express repudiation of the Court by Congress or the 
federal executive. Absent such repudiation, Congress and the federal 
113. w. Shakespeare, JULIUS CAEsAR, Act III, ii, line 94, in THE COMPLETE WORKS 
OF SHAKESPEARE 648 (Wright ed. 1936). 
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executive would, by definition, support the Court. For example, 
enforcement of the Court's holding in the particular case would 
signal federal executive support of the Court in future cases raising 
the same constitutional issue.114 Accordingly, the full panoply of 
federal power would always be available to enforce against state 
governments precisely the obligation which modified judicial su-
premacy requires. Conversely, at precisely the time when congres-
sional or presidential repudiation of the Court would divide and 
weaken federal power, the compliance obligation of state govern-
ments would cease to exist. Obligation and power would largely 
coalesce. Moreover, under modified judicial supremacy, only a re-
gional grouping of state power approaching the magnitude of the 
Confederacy in the Civil War could cause a substantial divergence 
between obligation and power. And even there, federal power 
eventually held sway. Concededly, state governments, through various 
tactics of active and passive resistance, can obstruct significantly the 
enforcement of Supreme Court decisions. If, however, the federal 
government remains unified in its support of a Supreme Court con-
stitutional construction, the power reality is that the Court's con-
struction will prevail ultimately over conflicting state action. 
Where does this leave the public school principal who disagrees 
with the Supreme Court's constitutional construction in Schempp? 
Like the school children in Tinker v. Des Moines School District,115 
it can be said of a school principal that he does not "shed [his] con-
stitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the school-
house gate."116 Accordingly, the principal would have a constitu-
tional right to criticize Schempp robustly. More precisely, if the 
principal's speech falls short of advocacy which "is directed to in-
citing or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite 
or produce such action,"117 his speech would be protected con-
stitutionally under the current Supreme Court standards. The prin-
cipal, however, would have an equally clear constitutional duty to 
implement Schempp immediately in his own school and to support 
its requirements affirmatively with the power of his office without 
awaiting the compulsion of a specific court order. 
114. See Titles IlI and IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(b)-(c)(9) 
(1970), for an example of congressional support of the Court's constitutional construc-
tion in Brown. Here, Congress enacted legislation which has enhanced the ability of 
private citizens and the United States Attorney General to secure the desegregation of 
public facilities and of public education. 
115. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
116. 393 U.S. at 506. 
117. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
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E. The Private Citizen Holding 
No Public Office 
Congress shall make no law .•. abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.11s 
The private citizen holding no public office lacks the power 
possessed by public officials to block implementation of Supreme 
Court decisions. Concededly, the private citizen, particularly in 
combination with others, possesses some power in this regard, but 
the problem is less acute than when a public official sets the power of 
his office against the Court. Still, a private citizen's ability to in-
fluence public events is sufficiently strong to merit a brief analysis 
of the citizen's relationship to a Supreme Court constitutional con-
struction. 
Like the school principal in the preceding subsection, the private 
citizen retains at all times his constitutional right to freedom of 
expression. Thus, the private citizen has a constitutional right to 
engage in vigorous, intemperate, and even crude criticism of a 
Supreme Court decision. As an agency of government, the Court 
has no greater immunity to verbal attack than Congress or the federal 
executive. At the same time, the private citizen has a constitutional 
duty not to interfere with the implementation of a Supreme Court 
constitutional construction at any level of government. Any such 
interference would constitute an unlawful act, whether directed 
at a specific court order or a public official's effort at voluntary com-
pliance. Concretely, the private citizen would have a clear duty not 
to impede execution of a court order which requires a named school 
district to comply with Schempp. Perhaps even more importantly, 
the private citizen would have an equally clear duty not to impede 
a school district's effort to execute voluntarily the Schempp mandate. 
As with the school principal, a private citizen's advocacy is pro-
tected unless it "is directed to inciting or producing imminent law-
less action and is likely to incite or produce such action.''11° For 
example, if school parents express to the school principal their 
belief that Schempp should not be followed in their school, this, 
under the Brandenburg standard just quoted, would constitute pro-
tected speech. The parents are making only a statement of belief 
and are not urging action. If these same parents initiated a campaign 
urging teachers at their school to wreck immediately the principal's 
efforts at compliance with Schempp, this, under the circumstances 
prevalent today in most American school districts, would constitute 
118, U.S. CONST., amend, I. 
119. 395 U.S. at 447. 
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unprotected advocacy, an urging of imminent lawless action under 
circumstances where such action is likely to occur.120 
If Congress (or the federal executive) expressly rejects a Supreme 
Court constitutional construction, this rejection would release the 
private citizen from his duty of noninterference. Like the state 
official, and for the same reasons,121 the private citizen would then 
be free to choose and support his champion among the competing 
branches of the federal government. He could urge teachers and 
principals to follow immediately the congressional example; because 
of Congress' rejection, the citizen would no longer be urging the 
commission of an unlawful act. For reasons already stated, con-
gressional or presidential rejection of the Court will occur rarely.122 
Accordingly, for the citizen, the duty of noninterference will be the 
prevailing reality and should thus receive the main conceptual 
stress. Human frailty argues against universal acceptance of this 
duty; protection against atomistic chaos requires its adoption as the 
governing constitutional standard. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The conclusions reached in this Article are designed to further 
four policy goals within the federal system: fidelity to the wording 
of the Constitution; predictability of reaction to a Supreme Court 
constitutional construction; generous opportunity for political en-
deavor; and the approximation of legal obligation to the realities 
of political power. If advanced too far, each of these policy goals 
would encroach unduly on the remaining three. Hence, to maximize 
the realization of all four goals, compromise is essential. This com-
promise occurs through the varying applications of judicial su- · 
premacy and viable tension to the several parts of the federal system. 
To apply either of the competing models to all parts of the federal 
system would promote some of the enumerated policy goals to the 
practical exclusion of others. 
In the application of the competing models to the federal system, 
judicial supremacy clearly predominates. This is as it should be. 
Noncompliance with a Supreme Court constitutional construction 
should not be legalized lightly. Generally, the nation's conception of 
oughtness should favor the construction's binding force. Without 
this prevailing conception of oughtness, the federal system would 
120. A detailed analysis of the "free speech" area is beyond the scope of this Article. 
See generally Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and Present Danger": From Schenck to 
Brandenburg-And Beyond, 1969 Sup. Ct. Rev. 41, for a discussion of how the Bran-
denburg test evolved. 
121. See text preceding note 101 supra. 
122. See notes 83-90 supra and accompanying text. 
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disintegrate. In this regard, the application of viable tension to 
Congress and the federal executive does legitimate rejection of the 
Court by those two branches. Admittedly, this concession carries 
some risk of disintegration within the federal system. The risk, how-
ever, is confined to the parts of the federal system least likely to 
abuse the right of rejection. More importantly, the right of rejection 
must exist somewhere if the federal system is to have a legal means of 
resisting judicial encroachment in the particular case before the 
Court. At the federal government level, I would accept the risk of 
disintegration, which history indicates is slight, to preserve the right 
of rejection. In response to a Supreme Court constitutional construc-
tion, the federal system should offer a wider choice than acquiescence 
or illegal repudiation. 
Conceptually, my description of the federal system attempts to 
match the definition of legal obligation to the realities of political 
power. Why this concern? Concededly, the existence of a legal obliga-
tion does not depend on whether the obligation can be enforced. 
Much of international law, for example, envisions legal obligations 
under circumstances where no enforcement power exists.123 Closer 
to home, it is quite possible to say that Congress and the federal 
executive are obligated legally to comply with a Supreme Court 
constitutional construction, even if the power to enforce this com-
pliance is lacking. Here, indeed, the nation's conception of oughtness 
could give practical efficacy to the obligation as defined. Granting 
all this, the question remains: Why construct a national political 
system which risks a wide divergence between obligation and power? 
A nation differs from the international community. It is an organized 
political system in which the ability to enforce legal obligations is a 
vital component of justice. Clearly this is true of legal obligations 
which go to the heart of the system under consideration. Within the 
federal system, compliance ·with a Supreme Court constitutional 
construction is such an obligation. Accordingly, absent a compelling 
reason to do otherwise, this obligation should be defined in such 
a way as to ensure its enforceability. In a matter essential to its 
survival, the federal system should not make a promise that it cannot 
keep. 
123 .••• a law may be established and become international, that is to say bind-
ing upon all nations, by the agreement of such nations to be bound thereby, al• 
though it may be impossible to enforce obedience thereto by any given nation party 
to the agreement. The resistance of a nation to a law to which it has agreed does 
not derogate from the authority of the law because that resistance cannot, perhaps, 
be overcome. Such resistance merely makes the resisting nation a breaker of the 
law to which it has given its adherence, but it leaves the law, to the establish-
ment of which the resisting nation was a party still subsisting. 
Osaka Shusen Kaisha v. Owners of the S.S. Prometheus, 2 Hongkong L.R. 207,225 (1904) 
(opinion of Acting Chief Justice Berkeley). See also J. BRIERLY, supra note 6, 
